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DEATH, LAW & POLITICS: THE EFFECTS OF 
EMBRACING A LIBERTY-RESTRICTIVE VS. A LIBERTY-
ENHANCING INTERPRETATION OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Marvin L. Astrada* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus, commonly referred to as the “[G]reat [W]rit,”
essentially prevents the State from unlawfully depriving a subject of 
its liberty.1  Habeas played a fundamental role in the development of 
American law since the inception of the United States.2  Habeas, 
inherited from the English common law, has remained a mainstay of 
U.S. criminal law and procedure.3  This is the case, in part, because 
habeas historically embodies cardinal notions of due process and fair 
representation in law—notions associated with the preservation of 
civil rights and liberties that have underpinned the character and 
content of American law from the founding to the present.4  As early 
as “the Philadelphia Convention and in the struggle for ratification, 
there was never the slightest objection to according a special 
preeminence to the Great Writ.”5  James Madison’s notes on the 
Constitutional Convention document some of the Founder’s views of 
habeas in the constitutional order, demonstrating how “[t]he 
American colonists . . . linked habeas corpus with due process of 
law.”6  “In 1787, the drafters of the Constitution assumed that some 
* Marvin L. Astrada (M.A., PhD., Florida International University; J.D., Rutgers
University Law School; M.A., C.A.S., Wesleyan University; B.A. University of
Connecticut) teaches in the Politics & History Department at New York University –
Washington D.C.  I would like to thank the editors of the University of Baltimore Law
Review for their time, effort, and professionalism throughout the editing process,
which directly enhanced the final version of this work.
1. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980).
2. See id. at 6–7.
3. See id. at 6.
4. See id.
5. Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 608
(1970).
6. Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2337 (1993).
From Madison’s notes on August 28, 1787:
 Mr. Pinkney, urging the propriety of securing the benefit of 
the Habeas corpus in the most ample manner, moved “that it 
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form of habeas corpus would be available and thus provided that the 
privilege of the writ could not be ‘suspended’ except in ‘Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion.’”7  Habeas has thus been an integral part of 
the development of U.S. constitutional history, American political 
philosophy, and law.8   
In the present, competing interpretations of what habeas entails and 
how it should be applied reflect both continuity and change regarding 
the role that the federal courts should assume in overseeing the 
exercise of the States’ police power.9  As far as continuity, habeas 
remains a reflection and product of a national ethos that, at its core, 
expresses an overarching American preoccupation with checking the 
power of the State(s) to deprive individuals of their liberty interest, 
including a basic right to life.10  Over time, habeas, as with other 
constitutional norms, values, and textual references, has evolved; its 
interpretation, role, and legal effect have undergone substantial 
change since 1787.11  The political and judicial branches have 
reconfigured habeas in form and substance, and presently, habeas has 
been reinterpreted in a manner that substantially restricts the scope of 
its application.12  Modern habeas, in practice, “is laced with doctrinal 
should not be suspended but on the most urgent occasions, & then 
only for a limited time not exceeding twelve months.”   
Mr. Rutlidge was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolable 
– He did [not] conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary
at the same time through all the States –
Mr. Govr Morris moved that “The privilege of the writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless where in cases of 
Rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. 
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of 
-1787-vol-2 (alteration in original).
7. Yackle, supra note 6, at 2337.
8. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL 
OVERVIEW 1, 3 (2006), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33391.pdf.
 By the colonial period, “habeas corpus” had come to be 
understood as those writs available to a prisoner, held without 
trial or bail or pursuant to the order of a court without jurisdiction, 
ordering his jailer to appear with the prisoner before a court of 
general jurisdiction and to justify the confinement. 
Id. at 3. 
9. See id. at 1.
10. See Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus in Three Dimensions Dimension III: Habeas
Corpus as an Instrument of Checks and Balances, 8 NE. U. L.J. 251, 303, 305 (2016);
Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 728–30 (1980) (discussing
ethos and its role in the law).
11. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 3–9.
12. See id. at 14.
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intricacy, which conceals underlying disagreements over [some 
fundamental] values: the vindication of individual rights, the 
decentralization of governmental power, and, [more importantly,] 
cutting across these themes, the role of the federal courts in our 
national life.”13   
In light of the foregoing, this article explores the notion that 
modern habeas, until relatively recently, has in part functioned as an 
explicit check on state judicial power to deprive petitioners—
especially poor people of color—of their liberty interest in the post-
conviction review of capital cases wherein race and class each play a 
negative role in capital convictions.14  “In the post-Furman era, 
American courts have routinely rejected challenges to death 
sentences based on race . . . .”15  Yet, race continues to play a 
profoundly negative role in skewing the aim of obtaining equal 
justice under law via due process and fair representation in the realm 
of capital punishment.16  This article critically examines the role that 
habeas assumes in the administration of justice pertaining to capital 
punishment, especially in procedural and substantive collateral 
challenges to states’ capital convictions.17  More specifically, this 
article contextualizes and examines select structural issues immanent 
in the present post-conviction regime ushered in by the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),18 codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.19  
13. Yackle, supra note 6, at 2334.
14. See infra notes 31–43, 70–75 and accompanying text.
15. John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America‘s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for
Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 487, 547 (2016), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/
wlulr-online/vol73/ iss1/22 (citing United States v. Fell, 944 F. Supp. 2d 297, 349–51
(D. Vt. 2013); United States v. Williams, No. 4:08-cr-00070, 2013 WL 1335599, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Jackson v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 2d 514, 616 (W.D. N.C.
2009); Brown v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1349 (S.D. Ga. 2008)).
16. See id. at 565–67.
17. See infra Part III, Sections IV.A–B.
18. See infra Part III, Sections IV.A–B.
19. The AEDPA can be described as follows:
Major mid-1990s reform of habeas corpus as used to challenge 
criminal convictions.  Among other provisions, the law limits 
both the procedural and substantive scope of the writ. 
Procedurally, it bans successive petitions by the same person, 
requiring defendants to put all of their claims into one appeal. 
Substantively, it narrows the grounds on which successful habeas 
claims can be made, allowing claims only to succeed when the 
convictions were contrary to “clearly established federal law” or 
150 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 48 
AEDPA’s legal regime, which codifies the Supreme Court’s 
habeas jurisprudence since the 1970s, has the effect of negatively 
impacting state habeas petitioners (which as a class are 
overwhelmingly poor and people of color), specifically petitioners’ 
liberty interest based on due process and representational fairness.20  
This article explores the notion that AEDPA, as a legal regime, 
encompasses an overarching tension between viewing habeas as a 
liberty-enhancing versus a liberty-restrictive legal mechanism.21  The 
liberty-enhancing effect of habeas, generally speaking, can be 
observed when the law and the courts privilege due process and fair 
representation in the provision of adequate and learned capital 
counsel on behalf of petitioners.22  The liberty-restrictive effect of 
habeas, generally speaking, is observed when the law and the courts 
privilege efficiency, cost-effectiveness, comity, finality of legal 
process, and state police power.23  The tension between habeas as 
liberty-enhancing versus liberty-restrictive occurs within the larger 
context of federalism, and what standard of review should constitute 
proper federal oversight of states’ police powers.24  This article thus 
selectively examines and discusses habeas in the context of AEDPA 
to explore modern habeas’ impact as liberty-restricting or liberty-
enhancing.25 
A. The Politics of Modern Habeas
The exact role of the federal courts in national life, generally, and
the deference that the federal courts owe state court judgments, 
specifically, has informed the overarching debate over modern 
habeas.26  Habeas, historically and especially in the present, reflects 
tension, conflict between competing views of the role of federal 
an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), LEGAL INFO. INST., 
CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antiterrorism_and_effective_ 
death_penalty_act_of_1996_%28aedpa%29 (last visited Jan. 13, 2019). 
20. See Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations of the Antiterrorism Act’s
Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 414 (1998) (“Although the
AEDPA is written vaguely, it clearly attempts to speed up execution sentences and
eliminate multiple appeals.  In addition, the Act also appears to reduce federal habeas
corpus to a meaningless process.”) (citations omitted).
21. See infra Section IV.C.
22. See infra notes 57, 66, 75–78 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 74, 107–08, 143–44 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 79–80, 210–14 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Section IV.C.
26. See Woolley, supra note 20, at 418–19, 421.
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oversight of state police power.27  The power dynamics of habeas, 
and interpolations of habeas doctrinally, also have profound 
consequences for a class of petitioners that rely upon it to secure a 
semblance of substantive and procedural due process.28  Although 
modern developments in interpreting habeas have arguably restricted 
access to the writ, at no point has the Court ever relegated “state 
prisoners to the state courts for the protection of their constitutional 
rights” because “[t]he need for broad federal review of state criminal 
convictions was recognized throughout . . . [as] the only effective 
means of preserving the constitutional rights of state prisoners.”29  
Historically and in the present, state courts have not fully effectuated 
state prisoners’ constitutionally protected rights in the realms of 
criminal justice generally, and capital punishment specifically.30  
Habeas petitioners seeking due process and fair representation in the 
federal courts have traditionally employed habeas to question the 
constitutionality of state capital convictions based on explicit racial 
animus and discrimination.31  Race, as well as socioeconomic class, 
have played a profoundly negative and formative role in the 
administration of capital punishment.32   
It is impossible to find a time in American history, even 
well before the birth of the Republic, when the use of the 
death penalty was not racially inflected.  Even in 17th 
century colonial America, a frontier society in which overall 
populations were small and black inhabitants few, the rate 
of execution of blacks still far exceeded that of whites on a 
per capita basis.33 
Arguably, modern habeas has played what can be termed a liberty-
enhancing role in federal judicial oversight of state capital 
punishment.34  State petitioners have relied upon modern habeas to 
27. See id. at 434–36.
28. Carlos M. Vázquez, Habeas as Forum Allocation: A New Synthesis, 71 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 645, 651 (2017).
29. See id. at 700–01.
30. See Jennifer Schweizer, Racial Disparity in Capital Punishment and Its Impact on
Family Members of Capital Defendants, 10 J. EVIDENCE-BASED SOC. WORK 91, 92–
93 (2013).
31. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 14.
32. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the
(In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 245–53 (2015).
33. Id. at 245.
34. See Vázquez, supra note 28, at 681.
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help counter the explicit racial and class bias embedded in various 
state capital punishment schema.35  Habeas is thus emblematic of a 
procedural regime that has very real substantive effects, 
consequences on the very lives of those who rely upon it to obtain a 
modicum of fairness in the form of federal review.36  Consider, for 
example, the disconcerting case of Peek v. Florida.37  In this 1986 
case, the trial judge removed himself from the penalty phase of the 
trial after the defense counsel heard the judge state “[s]ince the 
nigger mom and dad are here anyway, why don’t we go ahead and do 
the penalty phase today instead of having to subpoena them back at 
cost to the state.”38   
Racial prejudice, hate, and discrimination, in conjunction with 
socioeconomic status, are at minimum brought to light and can be 
addressed in a federal forum that privileges due process and fairness 
of capital convictions.39  Race and class have continued to severely 
attenuate substantive due process of law and fair representation of 
poor people of color seeking equal justice under the law.40  Habeas 
35. See Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida
Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456, 458–61 (1981); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E.
Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal
Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 509 (1994); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v.
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388,
1388 (1988).
36. See Zeisel, supra note 35, at 458–61; see also Stevenson & Friedman, supra note 35,
at 509; Kennedy, supra note 35, at 1388.
37. Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1986).
38. Id. at 56 (stating that “[A]nother person heard the comment as: ‘Since the niggers are
here, maybe we can go ahead with the sentencing phase.’”).
39. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13. (11th Cir. 1982) (granting
petitioner habeas relief for ineffective assistance of council due, in part, to appointed
counsel referring to him as “a little old nigger boy” in court proceedings).  For another
example of a disturbing case wherein race is explicitly used by the bench, prosecutor,
and defense attorney to deprive a black defendant of due process and fair
representation, see Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F Supp. 1566, 1575–78 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d,
963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357 (1993).
It goes without saying that many institutions, as evidenced 
throughout America, have progressed towards racial equality: 
there are now teachers, mayors, doctors, and a United States (US) 
President of color.  However, there is one crucial institution that 
despite years of social activism and progress is still burdened by 
the heavy yoke of discrimination.  The criminal justice system is 
the one part of American society that has been least affected by 
the social progress that has virtually transformed other areas of 
society.  Nowhere within the criminal justice system is this lack of 
progress more evident than in the practice of the death penalty. 
2019 Liberty-Restrictive vs. Liberty-Enhancing Habeas Corpus 153 
assumed a liberty-enhancing character prior to the 1970s.41  Modern 
habeas, especially as construed during the Warren Court era, had the 
effect of providing petitioners with a degree of substantive due 
process and representation in protecting their liberty interest.42  
During the 1970s, with the advent of the Burger Court, habeas was 
substantially reconfigured as a liberty-restrictive mechanism, 
culminating with the passage of AEDPA in 1996.43 
Modern habeas, from the Warren Court until the Burger and 
subsequent Rehnquist Court, has provided state capital petitioners 
with a viable means to challenge state capital convictions in a federal 
forum.44  This was a significant development due to the fact that 
habeas petitioners at the state level have consistently been 
disproportionality comprised of poor people of color.45  Habeas has 
had the effect of bolstering the representation of petitioners’ liberty 
interests by curbing representational deficiency in the state capital 
punishment context.46  Moore v. Dempsey47 is indicative of a trend 
Michael Fraser, Crime for Crime: Racism and the Death Penalty in the American 
South, 10 SOC. SCI. J. 20, 20 (2010), http://repository.wcsu.edu/ssj/vol10/iss1/9. 
41. See Vázquez, supra note 28, at 681.
42. See Sergey Tokarev, Habeas Corpus: Modern History, U.S. CIV. LIBERTIES (Sept. 7,




45. As noted in the Summary of Statement by The Honorable H. Lee Sarokin, United
States District Judge for the District of New Jersey, to the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights May 20, 1993 (page 7):
[R]estrictions on habeas corpus will not affect those persons who
can afford competent and experienced counsel.  It will, however,
affect the poor, the uneducated and minorities - people typically
represented by assigned, overworked, understaffed and frequently
inexperienced and underpaid counsel.  The Writ is essential for
their protection, and its availability should not be curtailed merely
to avoid last minute petitions in death penalty cases.
Habeas Corpus: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 7 (1993).  In 2017, blacks constituted 
1,168 or 41.8% of death row inmates, and Latinos constituted 373 or 13.24% of death 
row inmates.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., 
DEATH ROW U.S.A.: SUMMER 2017 (2017), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ 
DRUSASummer2017.pdf. 
46. See Shelly Song, Race Consciousness in Imposing the Death Penalty, 17 RICH. J.L. & 
PUB. INT. 739, 744 (2014).
Research shows that racial bias is prevalent in cases where the 
prosecutor seeks the death penalty.  Racial bias exists when the 
prosecutor uses his or her discretion to determine which crimes 
are truly heinous enough to warrant the death penalty, including 
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wherein race plays a weighty role in the severe attenuation or utter 
disregard of the constitutional rights of people of color accused of 
capital crimes.48  In Dempsey, the Court found that the State judicial 
proceedings 
were thronged with an adverse crowd that threatened the 
most dangerous consequences to anyone interfering with the 
desired result [of conviction and death].  The counsel did 
not venture to demand delay or a change of venue, to 
challenge a juryman or to ask for separate trials.  He had 
had no preliminary consultation with the accused, called no 
witnesses for the defence although they could have been 
produced, and did not put the defendants on the stand.  The 
trial lasted about three-quarters of an hour and in less than 
five minutes the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the first degree.  According to the allegations and 
affidavits there never was a chance for the petitioners to be 
acquitted.49 
the race of the defendant and the victim.  Additionally, indigent 
capital defendants face the problem of inadequate defense counsel 
assigned to them by the court.  Since 1973, 143 people on death 
row have been exonerated for the crimes for which they were 
convicted based on their innocence.  Of the 143 death row 
exonerations, 72 people were black, 57 people were white, 12 
people were Latino, and 2 were other.  Since 1973, more African 
Americans have been exonerated from death row than any other 
racial population, providing further support that race is also a 
significant factor in wrongful convictions.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Making Race Matter in 
Death Matters, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 55, 64 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006); 
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, The Role of Victim’s Race and Geography on 
Death Sentencing: Some Recent Data from Illinois, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE
KILLING STATE, supra, at 117, 137; Maxine Goodman, A Death Penalty Wake-Up 
Call: Reducing the Risk of Racial Discrimination in Capital Punishment, 12 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 29, 29–30, 73 (2007). 
47. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
48. See id. at 87–90.
49. Id. at 89.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49, 71 (1932) (“In the light of the
facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion – the ignorance and illiteracy of the
defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and
the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact that their
friends and families were all in other states and communication with them necessarily
difficult, and, above all, that they stood in deadly peril of their lives – we think the
failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure
counsel was a clear denial of due process.”).
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Race played a fundamental and negative role in the proceedings and 
was viewed by the Court as a factor that directly motivated the mob 
mentality that obliterated the integrity of the state legal proceedings 
that, in turn, supported issuance of the habeas entitling the defendants 
to federal review.50  Dempsey is part of a long history wherein race 
continues to be a salient factor that negatively affects substantive due 
process, fairness and representation in capital punishment.51  
With the Court’s articulation of procedural due process grounds for 
reviewing and overturning a state capital conviction, and in the 
context of habeas and capital punishment, the role of the federal 
courts in national life gradually became the fulcrum of a restrictive 
versus expansionist view of the habeas.52  Habeas’ significance in the 
present can be summed up in the contrary politico-ideological 
positions of Professor Paul Bator and Justice Brennan, which reflect 
a liberty-restrictive versus liberty-enhancing interpretation of 
habeas.53  
In Professor Bator’s view, the limited scope of federal 
habeas review meant that the state courts often had the final 
word regarding the federal constitutional rights implicated 
in state criminal proceedings. This view was disputed by 
Justice Brennan, who, in Fay v. Noia, [372 U.S. 391, 426–
27 (1963),] maintained that habeas courts had always 
50. After Dempsey,
[I]t became clear that federal habeas was not limited to instances
of mob intervention or other external contaminants of the judicial
process; it reached deficiencies from within the process which
rendered the process so unfair as to result in a loss of life or
liberty without due process of law, whether they took the form of
a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony and suppression
of evidence that would impeach it, or of a denial of the assistance
of counsel in criminal prosecutions, or of confessions or guilty
plea secured by government coercion.
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 6–7 (footnotes omitted). 
51. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in
Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1395–96 (2016) (finding that the
American criminal justice system exemplifies institutions that are deeply affected by
race and class).
52. See Vázquez, supra note 28, at 646–47.
53. See id. at 647.
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provided plenary review of state prisoners’ fundamental 
rights.54  
 The debate that contextualizes modern habeas thus centers on the 
degree to which federal courts should provide substantive oversight 
over state capital punishment schema.55  Under a restrictive view, 
federal courts should apply a rational basis of review, rendering 
oversight minimal,56 and under an expansionist view, federal courts 
should apply strict scrutiny because “Constitutional guarantees 
of habeas corpus and the fundamental rights of life and liberty can 
only be protected under a system of judicial review which is strict in 
capital cases . . . .”57  These opposing positions reflect a fundamental 
tension in habeas between preserving the integrity of state power and 
ensuring that the law, in actuality, provides due process and 
representational fairness.58  
For those that adhere to a liberty-enhancing view, as Judge Motley 
notes, “habeas corpus is simply an area that cannot be left to the 
states” because the “very essence of habeas corpus claims implicates 
the United States Constitution and its Amendments.”59  Historically, 
“[s]tandardless discretion in state capital statutes allowed prosecutors 
and juries to reach different results in similar cases and insulated 
54. Id. (footnote omitted).
55. See id. at 663–64 (discussing the disputed scope of permissible federal habeas corpus
review).
56. See Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV.
557, 611 n.310 (1994); see also Steven Semeraro, Two Theories of Habeas Corpus,
71 BROOK. L. REV. 1233, 1248–49, 1276, 1280 (2006) (describing the restrictive view
as giving more deference to states over habeas review).
57. Margolis, supra note 56, at 562; see also Semeraro, supra note 56, at 1237 (“[T]he
writ in the United States has long embodied two competing ideologies.  First, a
powerful liberty-supporting ideology has enabled reformers to conceive of, and
opponents to accept, new possibilities for expanding liberty-enhancing rights.
Second, a counter-habeas ideology sees the writ as a dangerous get-out-of-jail-free
card that enables criminals to avoid just punishments.”).
58. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
59. Constance Baker Motley, Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Litigation in the U.S. Supreme
Court: Are the State Courts Our Only Hope?, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 101, 110
(1992); see also Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“[S]tates systematically violate criminal defendants’
rights.  Michigan, for example, routinely denies indigent criminal defendants’ access
to counsel, leaving them to represent themselves.  Capital defendants in Idaho who
discover six weeks after sentencing that the state withheld impeachment evidence
about prosecution witnesses are statutorily barred from challenging the state's
misconduct in state court.  In New York, courts routinely violate defendants’ due
process rights by misconstruing state procedural rules to prevent defendants from
raising substantive federal violations.”) (footnotes omitted).
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racial disparities from judicial review.”60  Modern habeas as 
interpreted by the Warren Court had the effect of providing some 
form of substantive relief from the racially discriminatory application 
of capital punishment.61  This is the case because habeas  
provides a procedural mechanism for raising claims that 
were not or could not have been raised on the direct appeal.  
Most of these claims challenge the prisoner’s detention on 
federal constitutional grounds.  The claims are constitutional 
in nature because federal courts only have jurisdiction to 
review constitutional challenges or the laws and treaties of 
the United States.62  
While it is the case that the Court has expressed “concern for 
federal-state comity . . . for respecting the ‘dignity’ of the states as 
sovereign entities,”63 and recognizing that the criminal law is mostly 
a state affair premised on the states’ police power,64 it is also the case 
that the Court appointed itself as the protector of “discrete and insular 
minorities.”65  Protecting the latter is in line with the Warren Court’s 
expansive liberty-enhancing interpretation of habeas.66  By restricting 
habeas as a viable means through which to challenge state capital 
proceedings, poor people of color, who fall into the “discrete and 
60. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 257.
61. See id. at 245, 253, 279, 282–84 (discussing the Court’s positive impact on
discriminatory application of the death penalty despite its insistence on race-neutral
rulings).
62. Cristina Stummer, Note, To Be or Not to Be: Opt-in Status Under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death, 25 VT. L. REV. 603, 605 (2001) (footnote omitted).
63. Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1125, 1149 (2005) (footnote omitted).
64. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating the civil
remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women Act as beyond Congress’s
authority to enact under the Commerce Clause); see also United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond
Congress’s authority to enact under the Commerce Clause); but see Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5, 9 (2005) (upholding Congress’s authority to apply the federal
Controlled Substances Act against personal use quantities of marijuana grown for
medical purposes).
65. Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products
Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165–66 (2004) (quoting United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
66. See id. at 169–70 (discussing the Warren Court’s shift in protecting individual rights
and liberties after Footnote Four).
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insular” classification, are directly and negatively impacted.67  The 
Court has had alternative justifications, i.e., preserving the integrity 
of state power and protecting “discrete and insular minorities,” for 
either expanding or constricting habeas.68  Presently, the Court has 
embraced the former.69   
Habeas has, for the past several decades, been steadily attenuated,70 
with the passage of AEDPA codifying the Court’s restrictive 
interpretation of habeas since the 1970s.71  Federal overview of state 
courts’ capital processes, which have historically deprived poor 
people of color of due process and fair representation,72 is thus 
caught within the opposing poles of liberty-restricting and liberty-
enhancing interpretations of habeas.73  The desire to render capital 
habeas efficient, to make habeas cost-effective, and to procure 
finality, while simultaneously respecting the states’ police power, has 
resulted in a liberty-restrictive interpretation of habeas.74  This 
interpretation is diametrically opposed to a liberty-enhancing 
interpretation of habeas.75  In Spencer v. United States,76 for instance, 
a dissent noted that “finality is not ‘the central concern of the writ of 
67. See Semeraro, supra note 56, at 1236 n.5; Gilman, supra note 65, at 172–73 (quoting
Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
68. See Hoffstadt, supra note 63, at 1149; see also Gilman, supra note 65, at 165–66.
69. See Primus, supra note 59, at 56.
70. Id. (“At its inception, federal habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions
was designed not just to correct individual errors but also to check systemic state
disregard for constitutional rights.  That vision has faded over time.  Today, judges
and scholars who disagree about many aspects of habeas corpus share the assumption
that the point of habeas is to remedy individual violations, and their disagreements
concern which individuals should be entitled to relief—those who are actually
innocent, those who were not afforded fair process, or those who had certain preferred
rights violated.  The struggle among these positions has created an unwieldy maze of
procedural obstacles that currently prevents habeas from acting as a meaningful check
at the systemic level.  As a result, many states now violate criminal defendants’
federal rights not just with impunity but also as a matter of routine.”).
71. Id. at 10.
72. See Goldfarb, supra note 51, at 1403, 1405.
73. See supra notes 52–61 and accompanying text.
74. See Vázquez, supra note 28, at 677, 679–80, 688.
75. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 585 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Nowhere
has a ‘proper respect for state functions’ been more essential to our federal system
than in the administration of criminal justice.  This Court repeatedly has recognized
that criminal law is primarily the business of the States, and that absent the most
extraordinary circumstances the federal courts should not interfere with the States’
administration of that law.”) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
76. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2014).
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habeas corpus’—‘fundamental fairness is.’”77  The Court has 
vacillated between finality and fundamental fairness in the context of 
habeas.78  
The tension between representation and efficiency, which takes 
place in the larger context of federalism, is reflected in AEDPA opt-
in procedures for states that seek an expedited and deferential 
standard of federal habeas review of their capital punishment regimes 
and process.79  Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which governs 
federal review of state death sentences, provides a case study that 
highlights structural issues that directly inform and impact the 
representational deficiency that undergirds habeas.80  Although 
AEDPA is a procedural legal regime, it nonetheless has very real 
substantive socioeconomic consequences.81  
Decisions about procedure are bound up with decisions 
about the particular individuals or disputes affected . . . .  
[P]rocedures for habeas corpus express views about what
procedural features are important and also about the moral
worthiness of prisoners . . . .  Examining which features of 
process are employed and which are neglected illuminates 
the underlying political and social judgments.82  
II. CONTEXTUALIZING MODERN HABEAS & THE
POLITICS OF REVIEW
As the Court notes in Gardner v. Florida,83 “death is a different 
kind of punishment from any other and . . . the sentencing process, as 
well as the trial itself, must satisfy . . . [d]ue [p]rocess.”84  Habeas is 
77. Id. at 1164 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
697 (1984)).
78. See infra notes 129–47 and accompanying text.
79. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012);
John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 275–
76 (2006).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 875 (1984).
81. See Nathan Nasrallah, Comment, The Wall that AEDPA Built: Revisiting the
Suspension Clause Challenge to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2016), http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/
caselrev/vol66/iss4/13.
82. Resnik, supra note 80, at 859.
83. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
84. Id. at 357–58.  See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (“[Death is]
the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties.”); California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983) (“[T]he qualitative difference of death from all other
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital
160 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 48 
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution,85 but it is not explicitly defined 
as a right.86  Because habeas has not been explicitly defined as a right 
in the fundamental law, it is readily subject to the ebb and flow of 
ideological currents in the political and judicial branches.87  In the 
case of modern collateral challenges to state court death sentences, 
habeas “is available to inmates in both federal and state custody,” and 
“the writ allows a state prisoner to argue federal claims in federal 
court.”88  Whether conceived of as a right or a legal mechanism, 
habeas has functioned to protect the liberty interest of petitioners.89  
sentencing determination.”); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“[C]apital cases . . . stand on quite a different footing than other 
offenses.”). 
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”).
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 11–13, 41–44, and accompanying text.
88. Woolley, supra note 20, at 417.
 In 1996, Congress narrowed the writ of habeas corpus 
through the passage of . . . [AEDPA].  AEDPA has three 
important aspects: first, it imposes a one-year statute of 
limitations on habeas petitions.  Second, unless a United States 
Court of Appeals gave its approval, a petitioner may not file 
successive habeas corpus petitions.  Third, habeas relief is only 
available when the state court’s determination was “contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
. . . .  
 Federal statutes (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2256) outline the 
procedural aspects of federal habeas proceedings.  There are two 
prerequisites for habeas review: the petitioner must be in custody 
when the petition is filed, and a prisoner who is held in state 
government custody must have exhausted all state remedies, 
including state appellate review.  Any federal court may grant a 
writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who is within its jurisdiction. 
The habeas petition must be in writing and signed and verified 
either by the petitioner seeking relief or by someone acting on his 
or her behalf.  The petition must name the custodian as the 
respondent and state the facts concerning the applicant’s custody 
and include the legal basis for the request.  Federal courts are not 
required to hear the petition if a previous petition presented the 
same issues and no new grounds were brought up.  Finally, a 
federal judge may dismiss the petition for the writ of habeas 
corpus if it is clear from the face of the petition that there are no 
possible grounds for relief. 
Habeas Corpus, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/habeas_corpus (last visited Jan. 13, 2019). 
89. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), supra note 19.
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Habeas has procedural and substantive protections built into it as a 
legal regime in thought and in practice.  Habeas requires a state to 
provide justification for holding an individual in custody, and 
“[p]rompt resolution of prisoners’ claims is a principal function of 
the habeas corpus procedure.”90  Further, habeas claims are only 
available after all other court and administrative remedies have been 
utilized.91  The “exhaustion doctrine,” as articulated by the Court in 
Wainwright v. Sykes,92 has been codified93 and remains an 
indispensable prerequisite for asserting habeas review.94  Habeas thus 
enables federal courts to exercise substantive review of state death 
sentences to ensure that a sentence does not violate the U.S. 
Constitution.95  As noted previously, post-conviction review is based 
on arguments that are purely constitutional in nature.96  
The irreversible effect of capital punishment—death—in 
conjunction with socioeconomic realities that attach to its 
implementation, e.g., overt racial and class factors that permeate 
capital punishment and poor people of color being fodder for capital 
punishment schema, merits examination.97  As Justice Douglas noted 
90. Elizabeth M. Bosek et al., Nature of Habeas Corpus Proceeding, in 15 CYCLOPEDIA 
OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 86:2 (3d ed. 2018) (footnote omitted); see also Ronald Quy
Tran, Comment, State Trial Courts as the New Champions of the Great Writ: An
Argument for a Statement of Decision in the Criminal Context, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 163,
193 (2012); Woolley, supra note 20, at 417.
91. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116–17 (1944) (holding that “[o]rdinarily an
application for habeas corpus by one detained under a State court judgment of
conviction . . . will be entertained by a federal court only after all state remedies
available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this Court by
appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted.”).
92. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80 (1977).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State; or . . . there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.”).
94. Jude Obasi Nkama, The Great Writ Encumbered by Great Limitations: Is the Third
Circuit’s Notice Requirement for Habeas Relief a Structural Bias Against “Persons in
Custody?”, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 193 (2001).
95. Id. at 197.
96. Stummer, supra note 62, at 605 (footnote omitted).
97. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST., THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967)); Betsy Dee Sanders Parker,
Note, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”): Understanding
the Failures of State Opt-in Mechanisms, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1972 (2007).
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in Furman v. Georgia,98 “[t]he death sentence is disproportionately 
imposed and carried out on the poor [and] the Negro.”99  Review is 
important because  
[t]he finality of a death sentence is unlike that of any other
penalty . . . .  [A] prisoner is suddenly confronted with the 
reality of impending death.  Such finality frequently 
prompts an especially vociferous pursuit of habeas corpus 
claims.  These claims are often a desperate attempt by the 
petitioner to find a violation of the prisoner’s constitutional 
rights, thereby allowing for relief from the impending 
sanction.100   
In light of this fact, competent post-conviction state counsel is 
necessary for petitioners to receive any degree of due process and fair 
representation.101   
Adequate and learned counsel, among other things, is key to 
meaningful and substantive representation to protect the liberty 
interest of petitioners.102  Capital litigation, due to its highly complex 
and technical nature, requires counsel that is sufficiently learned in 
the law to provide adequate representation which, in turn, helps 
ensure substantive due process.103  Yet, “the present system often 
does not provide this for indigents charged with a capital crime at the 
trial level,” ultimately undermining equality in the collateral review 
process, as there is no constitutional requirement ensuring post-
conviction counsel.104  In both the politics of death and the final 
application of procuring a death sentence, learned counsel is 
particularly important:  
98. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 249–50 (quoting U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST.,
supra note 97, at 143).
100. Parker, supra note 97.
101. See Stummer, supra note 62, at 610–11.
102. See id.; Furman, 408 U.S. at 249–50 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 97, at 143).
103. See Stummer, supra note 62, at 606–07.
104. Id. at 610–11 (footnotes omitted) (“This impairment undermines the fairness of the
collateral review process, because the constitution fails to provide post-conviction
counsel.  Because of this failure, competent post-conviction counsel is not available to
cure trial defects.  Since state post-conviction review usually provides a first time
opportunity for capital appellants to attack the constitutionality of their detention in
preparation for federal habeas review, a state’s failure to provide competent counsel
to indigent capital petitioners can literally be the difference between life and death.”).
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[T]he majority of capital appellants are indigent, uneducated
or illiterate . . . .  These petitioners need access to competent 
post-conviction counsel to decipher cryptic state and federal 
habeas statutes and to provide a searching and impartial 
examination of the claims that may warrant appeal on post-
conviction and federal review.  As Justice Kennedy [has] 
recognized, “[t]he complexity of our jurisprudence in this 
area . . . makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be 
able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without 
the assistance of persons learned in the law.”105 
Those who are in most need of having learned competent counsel due 
to indigency, illiteracy, and being mis- or under-educated require said 
counsel in order to ensure equal justice under law via due process.106  
A. The Development of Modern Habeas Debate: Pre-AEDPA
The modern debate over the role of habeas can be contextualized as
emanating from the following binary: between proponents of broad 
federal habeas who subscribe to the notion that every petitioner is 
entitled to review of a death sentence based on constitutional 
challenges to a conviction and sentence, and those who subscribe to 
the notion that federalism demands that the states’ police powers be 
respected and protected from intrusive federal oversight.107  The 
former notion is liberty-enhancing and the latter is liberty-
restricting.108  Under the expansive view of habeas, federal courts are 
not—nor should they be—deferential to state courts’ findings and 
proceedings.109  The federal courts can—and should—engage in de 
novo review of constitutional challenges, effectively undercutting 
state police power over capital punishment.110  In the noteworthy 
105. Id. at 606–07 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 423–42 (1961); Barry Friedman, A Tale
of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 254, 262, 264–68, 271, 334–35 (1988); John J.
Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 171–73, 175–76 (1948);
Frank W. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and the State Court Criminal Defendant,
19 VAND. L. REV. 741, 741–44, 746 (1966).
108. See Semeraro, supra note 56, at 1236–38.
109. See id. at 1257; Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508–09 (1953).
110. See Semeraro, supra note 56, at 1257.
By the early 1950s, the Court had held that the right to a public 
trial, the right to notice of charges, and the prohibition against 
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case of Brown v. Allen,111 the Court construed habeas expansively.112  
This posture, however, gradually changed with the advent of the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts.113  The latter Courts sought to rein in 
and severely restrict the expansive interpretation of habeas by the 
Warren Court.114  Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that habeas needed 
to be “crimped and [that] state court judgments should only be 
disrupted under extreme circumstances.”115  Additionally, the debate 
over habeas has been informed “by the equally vigorous and ongoing 
debate about capital punishment.”116 
The modern habeas debate can be traced through Court opinions, 
wherein the Court began a process of expanding the scope of federal 
habeas against the states.117  In Ex parte Hawk,118 the Court enhanced 
unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states.  The 
contemporary struggle with desegregation served as a harbinger 
of the challenges attendant to extending federal criminal 
procedure rights to the states.  Just as the 1867 Congress 
expanded habeas review, in Justice Brennan’s words, 
“anticipating Southern resistance to Reconstruction and to the 
implementation of the post-war constitutional Amendments,” the 
1953 [Brown] Court, after having limited the scope of the 1867 
Act for some 80 years, expanded habeas review anticipating state 
resistance to broader understandings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
Id. (quoting Brennan, supra note 107, at 426).  In Daniels, the Court stated that, a 
“District Judge [must] decide constitutional questions presented by a State prisoner 
even after his claims have been carefully considered by the State courts.”  Daniels, 
344 U.S. at 508.  
111. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
112. See id. at 463–65.  Brown can be viewed as a product or part of the Court’s expansive
“interpretations of the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights and of the extent to
which those guarantees were binding upon the states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7.
113. See Blume, supra note 79, at 265–66.
114. See, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (adopting a single standard for
excusing failure to state a claim in state procedural default and abuse of the writ
cases).
115. Blume, supra note 79, at 264; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining
a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988).
116. Blume, supra note 79, at 264 (“Almost all state death row inmates whose convictions
and sentences were affirmed by the state courts sought (and to this day seek) federal
review of their convictions and death sentences . . . after the . . . modern era of capital
punishment in 1976, the habeas debate intensified . . . To the anti-habeas camp, death
row inmates used the writ of habeas corpus to cheat (or at least delay) the executioner;
to the pro-habeas contingent, however, searching federal habeas review was
absolutely essential to avoid unjust executions.”).
117. The Court established the basis for modern federal habeas review in 1807.  See Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100–01 (1807).  In Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S.
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federal overview of state’s police power, historically considered to be 
in the province of the states.119  In Hawk, the Court found that  
[W]here resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a
full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised,
either because the state affords no remedy . . . or because, in
the particular case, the remedy afforded by state law proves
in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate . . . a federal
court should entertain [a] petition for habeas corpus . . . .120
In Brown v. Allen,121 the Court held that when a state prisoner has 
exhausted all state remedies and qualifies for federal court habeas 
corpus application, if “the state action was based on an adequate state 
ground, no further examination is required unless no state remedy for 
the deprivation of federal constitutional rights ever existed.”122  
Brown had a significant impact on habeas “because it eliminated the 
Hawk [sic] restriction that habeas corpus would not lie where the 
state provided a fair opportunity to adjudicate the issues.”123  Brown 
required that due process be substantive as well as procedural; 
procedural due process alone would not insulate state courts from 
federal overview.124  
Under the Warren Court, habeas became more robust as applied to 
federal oversight of state capital punishment schema and collateral 
attacks on state death sentences.125  An expansionist interpretation of 
habeas that began in Brown “arrived in full force with the Warren 
241, 252–54 (1886), the Court articulated the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, further 
developed in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117–18 (1944). 
118. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. at 114.
119. Id. at 118.
120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
122. Id. at 447–49, 452, 457–58, 461–62.
123. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 4, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2018) (“Under Brown, as
long as the petitioner showed a violation of constitutional rights and that available
state remedies had been exhausted, the federal courts would entertain the petition on
the merits.”).
124. Brown, 344 U.S. at 536–37.
125. See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1068 (2002) (“[The Warren Court reconfigured the] limited
conception of habeas, advancing a broad remedial vision for habeas in which the
federal courts would serve as the ultimate guardian of the rights of criminal
defendants not just in the extraordinary case, but in every case where the habeas
jurisdiction was invoked.”).
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Court’s 1963 decisions of Townsend v. Sain and Fay v. Noia.”126  In 
Townsend, the Court found that  
where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas 
corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas 
applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing 
in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a 
collateral proceeding . . . [A] federal court must grant an 
evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the 
following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual 
dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state 
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as 
a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the 
state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it
126. Resnik, supra note 80, at 877.  In 1963, the Court handed down three substantial
decisions pertaining to habeas: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 394 (1963), overruled by
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1992); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
310–13, 317, 322 (1963); and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963) (finding
that that “[c]ontrolling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal
habeas corpus . . . relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent
application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the
prior determination was on the merits, . . . (3) the ends of justice would not be served
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application”).
In the aggregate, these cases cut through the procedural thicket of 
state comity and state concerns about finality, and mandated 
federal relief from state court decisions which were in violation of 
the Federal Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, these 
habeas corpus decisions were consistent with the main thrust of 
the Warren Court in the 1960s to insure that the protections of the 
Bill of Rights were extended to defendants in state courts as well 
as to those in federal proceedings.  
 However, these decisions also affected the balance of power 
between state and federal governments in the enforcement of the 
criminal laws. As a result of these Warren Court decisions, the 
notion that there were ‘fifty laboratories’ to experiment with the 
rights of defendants died, and the balance of power with respect to 
the method of enforcement of these laws shifted dramatically to 
the federal government. 
Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism 
After the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 337, 340 (1997). 
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appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas 
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.127  
In Fay, the Court reaffirmed Brown, finding that “additional evidence 
could be taken at an evidentiary hearing” and federal habeas relief 
was possible “even though the petitioner was procedurally barred 
from obtaining collateral relief under state law because of his failure 
to utilize state remedies,” so long as the petitioner had not 
“intentionally bypassed” state remedies.128   
During the Warren Court era, the Court provided “powerful tools 
for state prisoners asserting federal habeas claims to challenge their 
convictions and ‘greatly expanded the role of federal habeas corpus, 
allowing federal courts significant power to overturn state court 
decisions.’”129  By expansively interpreting habeas, the Court 
bolstered federal oversight of state capital punishment, and in doing 
so attenuated the states’ police powers, which, in turn, had the effect 
of providing poor people of color a more viable means of obtaining 
some degree of due process and fair representation of their liberty 
interest under the U.S. Constitution.130  Protecting petitioners’ liberty 
interest and the provision of equal justice under law outweighed the 
states’ police power in effectuating capital punishment schemes.131  
In doing so, the Warren Court effectively protected the liberty 
interests of a basic right to life via due process of “discrete and 
insular minorities.”132  As noted by Judge Helen Ginger Berrigan of 
the District of New Orleans, Louisiana, the “poor quality of indigent 
defense is largely ignored by the public and by policy-makers.  After 
all, it’s about people accused of crime who are presumed guilty.  
They’re poor people, often unattractive, inarticulate, with no apparent 
constituency and no voice in public policy.”133 
127. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312–13.
128. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 4, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2018) (summarizing Fay,
372 U.S. at 398–99, 414, 421–22).
129. Casey C. Kannenberg, Wading Through the Morass of Modern Federal Habeas
Review of State Capital Prisoners’ Claims, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 107, 115 (2009)
(quoting Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors: Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, and the Right to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 467, 476 (2000)).
130. See Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 115; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
131. See Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 115.
132. See Gilman, supra note 65, at 165–66.
133. Barbara E. Bergman, Verbatim: Inaugural Remarks: August 6, 2005 – Portland,
Oregon, CHAMPION (Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers), Sept./Oct. 2005, at 42.
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Although the Warren Court’s interpretation of habeas had the 
effect of bolstering the representational capacity of petitioners, the 
Court subsequently began reconfiguring habeas.134  In Stone v. 
Powell,135 the Court found that if a “[s]tate has provided an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, 
the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted 
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence obtained 
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”136  
In Wainwright v. Sykes,137 the Court further restricted habeas review, 
replacing the “deliberate bypass standard for prisoners’ procedural 
defaults with the requirement of ‘cause and prejudice,’”138 rendering 
state habeas relief more elusive. 
In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,139 the Rehnquist Court made a further 
change in federal habeas reflecting courts’ desire to substantially 
restrict the scope of federal overview of the states’ exercise of police 
power in carrying out capital punishment.140  In Tamayo-Reyes, the 
Court reversed the 9th Circuit’s holding that the petitioner “was 
entitled to a federal hearing because counsel’s failure to make a 
sufficient factual record did not amount to a deliberate bypass of state 
procedures.”141  The Court noted that the stricter “cause and 
prejudice” standard should be “applied in instances where a 
petitioner has failed to develop a material fact in state court 
proceedings . . . .”142  
134. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797–98 (1970); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 764–67 (1970); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 262–66 (1973).
135. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
136. Id. at 482.
137. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
138. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 115 (“Under the new procedural default standard, ‘the
petitioner [must] show a cause for the noncompliance with state rules and actual
prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation . . . .’  In overruling Fay v.
Noia, the Court provided a ‘far more restrictive test,’ making it much more difficult
for prisoners to challenge their state convictions.”) (alteration in original).
139. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
140. See id. at 9.
141. Michele M. Jochner, ‘Til Habeas Do Us Part: Recent Supreme Court Habeas Corpus
Rulings, 81 ILL. B.J. 250, 260 (1993) (citing Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. at 11).
142. Id. at 543–44 (holding that “petitioners are entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing
only if they can show cause for their failure to develop the facts in state court
proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure, although the Court
provided a narrow exception in instances where a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’
will occur in the absence of such a hearing,” and “a federal habeas court should not
grant an evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner shows the error was the difference
between winning and losing”).
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From the 1970s through the 1990s, the Court reversed the 
trajectory of habeas, finding that the previous liberty-enhancing 
interpretation of habeas had the deleterious effect of diluting what it 
now felt constituted more important norms, values, and principles, 
including “finality, comity, [and] judicial economy”143—which are 
privileged in a liberty-restrictive interpretation of habeas.144  The 
Court further held that 
[a]pplying the cause-and-prejudice standard in cases like
this will obviously contribute to the finality of convictions,
for requiring a federal evidentiary hearing solely on the
basis of a habeas petitioner's negligent failure to develop
facts in state-court proceedings dramatically increases the
opportunities to re-litigate a conviction.  Similarly,
encouraging the full factual development in state court of a
claim that state courts committed constitutional error
advances comity by allowing a coordinate jurisdiction to
correct its own errors in the first instance.  It reduces the
“inevitable friction” that results when a federal habeas court
“overturn[s] either the factual or legal conclusions reached
by the state-court system.”145
The dissent in Tamayo-Reyes, on the other hand, argued that, 
“[u]nder the guise of overruling ‘a remnant of a decision,’ and 
achieving ‘uniformity in the law,’ the Court has changed the law of 
habeas corpus in a fundamental way.”146  Indeed, the Court’s 
interpretation had the effect of shifting habeas from a liberty-
enhancing to a liberty-restricting mechanism, further attenuating the 
representational integrity of state petitioners.147  Four years after 
Tamayo-Reyes, Congress enacted AEDPA.148  
III.  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT & AEDPA
A. AEDPA: Federal Habeas & Representational Deficiency
Under AEDPA, habeas has become, amongst other things, a site of
intense interpretive contestation between those who would expand 
143. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. at 8.
144. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
145. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. at 8–9.
146. Id. at 12 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
147. See supra notes 126–33 and accompanying text.
148. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2012).
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and those who would restrict the federal courts’ capacity to review 
post-conviction state death sentences.149  The Court, historically, has 
recognized, to varying degrees, the importance of habeas in the 
overarching legal system.  For example, in Preiser v. Rodriguez,150 
the Court noted that habeas preserves “for the state prisoner an 
expeditious federal forum for the vindication of his federally 
protected rights, if the State has denied redress.”151  Contestation over 
how and when exactly a state “has denied redress” has informed the 
debate as to how far to expand or constrict habeas.152  AEDPA, an 
attempt by the political branches to address the competing values and 
norms that undergird capital punishment in thought and practice, 
exemplifies the deep tension between representation (liberty-
enhancing) and efficiency (liberty-restricting) in the interpretation of 
habeas.153 
The enactment of AEDPA resulted in the codification of a liberty-
restrictive ethos.154  AEDPA, generally speaking, has been criticized 
as “a complex, poorly drafted statute that is impossible to interpret 
logically and consistently,” the text of which, “read as a whole, is 
irresolvably ambiguous.”155  Aside from the text itself being 
problematic, AEDPA also embodies the politics of death in that it is 
underpinned by ideological fidelity to the preservation of and 
deference to state police power.156  AEDPA is entrenched in a 
perspective that privileges the integrity of state police power over the 
federal court’s mandate(s) to protect “discrete and insular minorities” 
and provide equal justice under law via due process and fair 
representation.157  Although habeas is a creature of and emplaced in 
the fundamental law put forth in the U.S. Constitution,158 the states 
149. See infra notes 150–78 and accompanying text.
150. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
151. Id. at 498.
152. See Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. PA. J. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 1, 16–18 (2016).
153. See id. at 5–7.
154. “The debate that led to passage was marked by complaints of delay and wasted
judicial resources countered by the contention that federal judges should decide
federal law.”  DOYLE, supra note 8, at 14.
155. Amy Knight Burns, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis
of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 206–07 (2013) (footnote omitted).
156. See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 109–10 (2012).
157. See id.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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are nonetheless given preference in the administration of death via 
capital punishment.159  
Some of the changes inaugurated by AEDPA that have diminished 
the due process and representational integrity of federal oversight of 
state capital proceedings include the following:160 
1. It enacts a statute of limitations for habeas review.
Prior to AEDPA, there was no set time limit on a 
petitioner’s ability to seek federal review.  AEDPA contains 
a one-year statute of limitations with various tolling 
provisions.  In most cases, the limitations period 
commences on the date the Supreme Court denies certiorari 
following direct appeal. 
2. It places restrictions on a petitioner’s ability to file
subsequent petitions after the initial petition. The federal 
courts must dismiss any claim raised in a previous petition. 
Claims not previously raised are also subject to dismissal 
unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate either that the 
claim relies on a new retroactive legal rule, or that new facts 
have been discovered (which could not have been 
discovered previously), and that these facts establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder 
would have found the petitioner guilty.  
3. It provides the Courts of Appeals, rather than the
District Courts, final say as to whether a subsequent petition 
may be filed after the initial petition.  This has the effect of 
petitioners having to rely upon courts that are quite removed 
from the undocumented dimensions of a trial that the 
District Courts have direct access to.  
4. It regulates the circumstances under which a District
Court is permitted to convene an evidentiary hearing in 
cases wherein the petitioner fails to take advantage of State 
court fact-development opportunities. 
5. It alters the exhaustion of State remedies requirement.
159. See Marceau, supra note 156, at 109–10.
160. See Blume, supra note 79, at 270–71; Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven
Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas Capital Appeals, 18 J. L. & POL. 773, 804–05
(2002).
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6. It modifies preexisting law regulating appeals in habeas
matters.161 
AEDPA’s Chapter 154 created a new set of procedures for capital 
cases in opt-in jurisdictions,162 and § 2254(d) limits the 
circumstances under which a federal court can actually grant habeas 
review.163  One of its objectives was to provide “expedited 
procedures in federal capital habeas corpus cases when a state is able 
to establish that it has provided qualified, competent, adequately 
resourced and adequately compensated counsel to death-sentenced 
prisoners.”164  When AEDPA was first enacted, the federal courts 
were originally tasked with analyzing and ascertaining whether states 
qualified for expedited federal habeas procedures, but the enactment 
of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 
shifted eligibility determination to the Attorney General from the 
judiciary.165  It appears the shift was intended, in general, to further 
distance the federal courts from habeas, placing eligibility 
161. See Daniel J. O’Brien, Heeding Congress’s Message: The United States Supreme
Court Bars Federal Courthouse Doors to Habeas Relief Against All but Irrational
State Court Decisions, and Oftentimes Doubly So, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 320, 322
(2012); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 480–81 (2000).
162. See 28 U.S.C §§ 2261–2266 (2012).  For the states that ‘opt-in,’ the AEDPA
provisions apply to habeas corpus appeals from prisoners in that state.  See § 2261(a).
States that opt-in must create a mechanism for the appointment and compensation of
counsel in post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent death row prisoners.  See
§ 2262(b).  Prisoners in states that opt-in cannot present claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel during state or federal post-conviction proceedings in section
2254 proceedings.  See § 2261(e).  The provision seems to be redundant in light of
section 2254(i), which states that a section 2254 claim for relief cannot be based on
the ineffective assistance of counsel during collateral post-conviction proceedings.
See § 2254(i).  However, section 2261(e) adds that the court may appoint a different
counsel at any phase of state or federal post-conviction proceedings based on the
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in such proceedings.  See § 2261(e).  For
state death row prisoners in states that opt-in to the AEDPA, the time limits for filing
a habeas corpus petition in federal court are more stringent than the one-year limit for
other habeas corpus petitioners.  See § 2263(a).  Instead of a one-year time limit,
condemned prisoners are given only 180 days to file from the time of the last state
court review or final disposition of the United States Supreme Court review of the
final state court review.  Id.; 6 WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 6956
(2018).
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4261.1 (3d ed. 2018).
164. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517 CW, 2013
WL 6326618, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013).
165. Id.; USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
120 Stat. 192 (2006) (amending Chapter 154).
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determination in the hands of the Executive.166  The overall changes 
wrought by AEDPA in reconfiguring habeas have laid the foundation 
for isolating petitioners seeking federal review.167  In particular, 
section 2254(d)(1) has the effect of silencing petitioners’ attempts for 
review and redress, “leaving them powerless against state abuses” 
because it “bars habeas petitioners from obtaining federal post-
conviction relief for any claims decided in state court, unless the 
petitioner can show that the state court decision is irrational—a 
standard that has proven almost impossible to meet.”168 
Expedited federal review of state capital proceedings via state opt-
in, as governed by Chapter 154, provides a number of procedural 
advantages to qualifying states.169  Granted, no state has yet qualified 
for opt-in due to their persistent failure to provide “qualified, 
competent, adequately resourced and adequately compensated 
counsel.”170  Nonetheless, opt-in procedures are designed to 
encourage states to participate in a federal habeas review process 
underpinned by the overarching aim of promoting efficiency and 
maintaining state integrity vis-à-vis the criminal law.171  States can be 
considered the primary beneficiaries of AEDPA because the legal 
regime it implements is premised on a liberty-restrictive basis that 
privileges state independence from federal overview in the exercise 
of its police power.172  Deference to the states in the realm of 
166. See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
167. Nasrallah, supra note 81, at 1148.
168. Id.
169. Marianne L. Bell, Note, The Option Not Taken: A Progressive Report on Chapter 154
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
607, 607–08 (2000).
170. Id. at 150; Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr., 2013 WL 6326618, at *1.
171. See Nasrallah, supra note 81, at 1151; Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr., 2013 WL 6326618,
at *3 (describing the expedient timeline of federal review of “opt-in” states).
172. Nasrallah, supra note 81, at 1148.
AEDPA has the purposive effect of marginalizing the due process 
and fair representation of poor people of color by gutting habeas 
of its functional liberty-enhancing effect as interpreted by the 
Court in the 1960s.  This is the case because the present iteration 
of habeas under AEDPA mandates deference to States, and it 
makes it so that (1) all claims “adjudicated on the merits” in state 
court receive deference; (2) that deference requires petitioners to 
show that the state court decision was “contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of” federal law, perhaps the most 
deferential standard in all of Supreme Court jurisprudence; (3) the 
federal law applied in the state court must be “clearly established, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”   
Id. at 1149. 
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criminal law generally and capital punishment in particular remains 
problematic, however, given the states’ lengthy, negative relationship 
with people of color (and poor people of color, in particular).173 
Issues pertaining to race and class persist in the realm of criminal 
justice.174  While overt discrimination within the criminal justice 
system has been reduced over the past several decades, the U.S. 
continues to work through real and perceived systemic unfairness 
that is evidenced by racial and ethnic disparity and 
overrepresentation of minorities in “delinquency, offending, 
victimization, and at all stages of the criminal justice process from 
arrest to pretrial detention, sentencing (including capital punishment), 
and confinement.”175 
Hence, the deleterious effects that a liberty-restrictive interpretation 
of habeas has on poor people of color that seek due process, 
representation, and fair review of sentences imposed by states that 
have a very poor history of providing actual due process of law and 
ensuring genuine representation of petitioners’ liberty interests.176  
Indeed, “[t]he death penalty has frequently targeted the illiterate, the 
poor, the intellectually disabled, and racial minorities, and often in 
not-so-subtle ways.”177  Some of the more vulnerable members of 
society are thus irreparably harmed rather than helped by attenuating 
the procedural and substantive protections that habeas provides when 
articulated from a liberty-enhancing perspective.178 
173. KATHERINE J. ROSICH, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, AM. 
SOC. ASS’N 2 (2007), http://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/ images/press/
docs/pdf/ASARaceCrime.pdf (“For much of the twentieth century, crime and
punishment have provided some of the most powerful symbols of the racial divide in
America.  In the early decades, lynchings, chain-gang style penal practices, and
prosecutorial and judicial bigotry were common, particularly in the southern criminal
justice systems.  Throughout the United States, racial minorities were generally tried
by all white juries in all white courtrooms, as was the case, for example, in the 1931–
32 Scottsboro rape trial.  In 1910, African Americans, who were about 11 percent of
the U.S. population, were 31 percent of the prison population.  African Americans
accounted for 405 of the 455 of executions for rape between 1930 and 1972.
Sentencing laws were discriminatory, with the harshest sanctions given to blacks who
victimized whites.”).
174. Id. at 2–3.
175. Id.
176. See Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in §
2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5–6 (2010) (arguing that the
AEDPA’s constraint of federal review constitutes a lack of due process).
177. Bessler, supra note 15, at 499.
178. See Marceau, supra note 176, at 5–6.
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B. AEDPA – Impact on Federal Habeas Review
In Calderon v. Ashmus,179 the Court noted that AEDPA’s expedited
review process accomplishes the following aims: it imposes a 180–
day limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition; treats an 
untimely petition as a successive petition when considering a stay of 
execution; allows a petition to be amended after answer is filed only 
when petitioner meets the requirements for a successive petition; 
obligates a district court to render final judgment on petition within 
180 days of filing; and requires that a court of appeals render a final 
determination within 120 days.180  The Ashmus Court’s declaration 
favors the states because petitioners must file for habeas “even if they 
do not have officially appointed counsel, they do not know which 
statute of limitations applies, and they are unsure of which claims 
must be included . . . [and] only by filing a federal habeas petition 
may a prisoner argue that the state does not meet the statutory 
requirements to opt-in.”181 
 AEDPA’s shorter statute of limitations period, construing an 
untimely-filed petition as constituting a subsequent petition, and its 
permitting the amendment of a petition only after a response is filed 
if the petitioner satisfies rigorous standards for a successive petition, 
both produce a liberty-restrictive effect.182  These procedural changes 
in obtaining habeas are not designed to enhance or facilitate 
petitioners’ interests in obtaining substantive federal review of state 
convictions but rather help streamline the process so that quicker 
resolution can be obtained for state courts.183  In many cases, for 
instance, Chapter 154 prevents a federal court from reviewing a 
claim that the state courts found to be procedurally defaulted, as 
well.184  This has the effect of favoring procedure that moves the 
appeals and review process along by restricting and constricting 
federal review.185  
Section 2254(d), which many commentators agree is the 
centerpiece of the AEDPA legal regime,186 bars habeas review or 
relief on a claim already passed upon by a state court out of 
179. Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 742 (1998).
180. Id.
181. See Bell, supra note 169, at 622.
182. Cf. id. at 622.
183. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517 CW, 2013
WL 6326618, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013).
184. Blume, supra note 79, at 272.
185. See id. at 270–72.
186. Id.
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deference to state courts.187  According to the Court, “an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law” 
transpires “when a state court ‘identifies the correct governing legal 
principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 
principle to the facts.’”188  Furthermore, the federal courts are not to 
assess whether or not the state court correctly applied federal law, but 
that a state court did so in a manner that was not “objectively 
unreasonable.”189  The Court has also declared that, “[s]tate-court 
factual findings . . . are presumed correct; the petitioner has the 
burden of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and convincing 
evidence.’  § 2254(e)(1).”190   
187. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (barring relief “unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding”).
This statutory language had no habeas pedigree; for example, it 
was not taken from any Supreme Court decision, like other 
AEDPA provisions, nor was it part of any previous habeas reform 
proposal offered by Congress . . . .  The floor debates and the 
perfunctory conference report on AEDPA are also un-illuminating 
regarding § 2254(d)’s intent.  Thus, for the most part, the federal 
courts were forced to divine its meaning from scratch. 
Blume, supra note 79, at 272–73. 
188. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
520 (2003)).
189. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 411 (2000)).
It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its “independent 
review of the legal question,” is left with a “‘firm conviction’” 
that the state court was “‘erroneous.’”  We have held precisely the 
opposite: “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ 
clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 
because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 
law erroneously or incorrectly.”  Rather, that application must be 
objectively unreasonable. 
Id. (citations omitted).  “The question under . . . (AEDPA) is not whether a . . . state 
court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable, 
which is a substantially higher threshold.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2254.  Schriro v. Landrigan, 
127 S. Ct. 1933 . . . (U.S. 2007)[.]”  39 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 7.5, Westlaw (database 
updated Sept. 2018).  See generally Death Penalty Reform & Savings Act, Cal. 
Proposition 66, 150–51 (approved Nov. 8, 2016) (changing California state court 
procedures for challenges to capital punishment convictions). 
190. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338–39 (2006) (citing Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 284 (2005)).
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Lastly, the Court’s interpretation of § 2254(d) has not fully 
clarified the intent undergirding the statutory language and how it is 
supposed to work in practice exactly, other than explicitly curbing 
the federal courts’ power to grant habeas review and relief.191  In 
Lindh v. Murphy,192 the Court declared that it was clear that § 
2254(d) dictates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-
court rulings” but does not provide specific standards by which to 
ascertain the exact application of the statutory language.193  
Additionally, the “Court has also said little about how § 2254(d) fits 
in with prior judge-made habeas doctrines,” rendering this area of the 
law unclear.194   
C. Codifying Deference to the State Courts
While AEDPA has ostensibly balanced the competing interests of
maintaining the integrity of State sovereignty and police power with 
while concomitantly “providing an avenue for federal relief in 
extreme cases,”195 this is not the case in practice.196  AEDPA does 
less balancing of competing interests; it actually accords more weight 
to state interest.197  This is the case because AEDPA does not 
function in a vacuum.198  Merely mandating adequate and competent 
191. See, e.g., DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 
HANDBOOK WITH FORMS app. A at 12–13 (2018) (“[A] habeas petitioner’s arguments
ultimately must be assessed under the deferential standard required by 28 U.S.C.A. §
2254(d)(1): relief may not be granted unless the state court adjudication “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”;
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) a certificate of appealability should issue if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, which
we have interpreted to require that the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong; under the controlling standard, a petitioner must show that reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have
been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.”) (citing Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274
(2004)).
192. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
193. Id. at 333 n.7.
194. Blume, supra note 79, at 273 (“For the most part, the Court has gravitated towards
talismanic characterizations of § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable
application’ clauses, while remaining virtually silent about § 2254(d)(2).”).
195. Samuel R. Wiseman, What Is Federal Habeas Worth?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1157, 1160
(2015).
196. See id. at 1160–61.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 1194.
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counsel during the post-conviction review process, while desirable, 
will not address the historical and socioeconomic and political 
(structural) context within which capital punishment transpires.199  
The lengthy, violent, discriminatory treatment of poor people of color 
based on racial animus in the state criminal justice context, combined 
with finite and scarce human and financial resources to provide said 
adequate and competent counsel, reinforce the liberty-restrictive 
effect of AEDPA in legal actuality.200   
The overarching aim of AEDPA is to “ensure that federal habeas 
relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 
criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction. 
Enactment of [AEDPA] served to limit, rather than expand, 
availability of habeas.”201  AEDPA has thus further negatively and 
disproportionately impacted poor people of color in the realm of 
capital punishment that have employed habeas to obtain a degree of 
due process, fair representation, and equal justice under law.202  
Overall, AEDPA has altered “the standard of habeas corpus review in 
199. See, e.g., Steven B. Bright, Rigged: When Race and Poverty Determine Outcomes in 
the Criminal Courts, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 263, 263–66 (2016). 
200. See Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation
of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV.
783, 793–94 (1981); MICHAEL K. BROWN, ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH 
OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 135–41 (2003); DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH 
& CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 1–2, 286 (1990).
201. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 7.5, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2018); see also Death
Penalty Reform and Savings Act, Cal. Proposition 66, 149–51 (approved Nov. 8,
2016) (showing that the timelines in California’s statute were substantially longer
than those laid out in the AEDPA); Leatherwood v. Allbaugh, 861 F.3d 1034, 1042
(10th Cir. 2017); Rountree v. Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2011); Lounsbury v.
Thompson, 340 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003) (withdrawn and superseded by 374
F.3d 785); Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 46 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
1026, 1081 (2017); Sara Rodriguez & Scott J. Atlas, Habeas Corpus: The Dilemma of
Actual Innocence, 34 LITIG. 35, 38 (2008).
202. See Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 341–50
(2006); see also ROSICH, supra note 173, at 20 (discussing how “[t]here is strong
evidence that racial discrimination exits in the capital sentencing process of many
states.  Numerous empirical studies clearly and consistently demonstrate that African
Americans are at far greater risk for capital punishment, particularly when considered
in context of victimization patterns.  Even before the landmark death penalty cases of
the 1970s, research (mostly conducted in the South) showed that African Americans
were much more likely than whites to receive the death penalty . . . .  The review by
Baldus and his colleagues indicates that, although these early studies (dating back to
the 1930s) have methodological limitations (i.e., key information such as defendants’
relative culpability, the heinousness of the crime, prior criminal record, or the race of
the victim may not be included), several show strong race-of-victim effects.”).
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ways that appeared to call for greater deference to state court rulings 
on legal issues and mixed questions of fact and law.”203  In Woodford 
v. Visciotti,204 for instance, the Court found that “a federal habeas
court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in
its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the
law] incorrectly.”205  The state’s prerogatives are thus privileged over
that of the petitioner, who historically has been discriminated against
by the criminal justice system and normalized as the “super predator”
(i.e., a poor person of color); this perspective fueled and is a mainstay
of present mass incarceration of racial and ethnic minorities in the
criminal justice system.206
In Williams v. Taylor,207 the Court addressed section 2254(d)(1), 
which allows the federal courts to grant habeas only if a state court 
had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably 
determined the facts of the case.208  In granting habeas, the Court 
emphasized an important difference between an “incorrect” 
application and an “unreasonable” application of clearly established 
federal law.209  Although the Court did not explain exactly what 
makes a decision unreasonable instead of simply incorrect, 
subsequent interpretations of AEDPA have established precedent 
according a high degree of deference to state court decisions when 
203. Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 702–03 (2002).  In Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), however, the Court rejected lower court
interpretations that called for substantial deference to State court rulings on legal and
mixed legal-factual rulings.  Id. at 376–79.  See also Woolley, supra note 20, at 432
(stating that a “deference standard that requires federal courts to defer to reasonable
state decisions is problematic for two reasons.  First, federal court deference
eliminates the safeguard against state abuse.  State judges are elected in a majority of
states with the death penalty.  Often, a federal judge is in a better position to reverse
an improper death sentence because the judge does not have the pressures of running
for reelection.  Second, if the AEDPA’s terms are interpreted strictly, federal courts
will be forced to affirm mistaken state decisions regarding federal and constitutional
law.”).
204. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24–25 (2002).
205. Id.
206. See Anne Gearan & Abby Phillip, Clinton Regrets 1996 Remark on Super-Predators’
After Encounter with Activist, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/25/clinton-heckled-by-black-
lives-matter-activist/; Michelle Alexander, Why Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Deserve the
Black Vote, NATION (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/
hillary-clinton-does-not-deserve-black-peoples-votes/.
207. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367, 398–99, 410–11 (2000).
208. Id.
209. Williams, 529 U.S. at 384–90.
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considering a habeas petition.210  Established precedent since the 
passage of AEDPA is part of an ethos wherein habeas apparently 
“frustrates ‘both the States sovereign power to punish offenders and 
their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.’”211  
Efficiency, finality, and comity are all values that undergird AEDPA, 
and that concomitantly undermine the liberty-enhancing capacity of 
habeas to serve those that most need due process and fair 
representation.212  AEDPA is a legal regime that, to some degree, 
contributes “to the cycle of mass incarceration, exacerbate[s] the 
distrust of the criminal justice system in poor communities, and 
increase[s] the likelihood of imprisoning innocent people for crimes 
they did not commit.”213  Streamlining habeas review is part of a 
deferential posture to state police power, and is a key factor that 
grounds AEDPA.214  The state courts’ determination of a factual 
210. Drew N. Goodwin, Refusing to “Kiss the Great Writ Good-Bye”: The Ninth Circuit,
in Doody v. Ryan, Ignores the Supreme Court’s Cues Regarding Federal Habeas
Relief, 53 B.C. L. REV. 31, 31–32 (2012); Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction:
Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts-
Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2449–50 (1998) (asserting
that Congress enacted AEDPA to limit federal authority for granting prisoners relief
in response to “the populist sentiment that courts are mollycoddling prisoners”);
William J. Meade, Case & Statute Comment, The Demise of De Novo Review in
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice, 85 MASS. L. REV. 127, 132 (2001) (explaining that
AEDPA “marks a great shift” to a system of federal review which more properly
respects state courts’ decisions).  Under AEDPA (§ 2254(d)(1)), Congress limited the
authority of federal courts to grant habeas review by enacting changes to “further
principles of comity, finality, and federalism, to encourage exhaustion of state
remedies, and to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences
– particularly in capital cases.”  Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) – U.S.
Supreme Court Cases, 26 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, Art. 1 (2008).
211. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555–56 (1998) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 487 (1986)).
212. Stevenson, supra note 202, at 339–45 (explaining that the AEDPA exacerbates the
United States’ incarceration rate, which is already the highest in the world, as well as
the perception that the criminal justice system is “unfair, corrupt, biased, and error-
plagued”).
213. Nasrallah, supra note 81, at 1153.
214. See Abigail Kite, Note, Fact-Finding Process Review Model: Remedying Fact-Based
Constitutional Challenges on Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 351, 376–79 (2009).  AEDPA requires petitioner to show that a State court’s
ruling was so lacking in justification that there was an error “‘beyond any possibility
for fair-minded disagreement’ . . . ‘[i]f this standard is difficult to meet’—and—‘that
is because it was meant to be.’”  Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19–20 (2013); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).  A decision is “contrary to clearly established law,” for purposes of
AEDPA, under which “a federal court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was contrary to, or involved
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issue when considering habeas review is presumed correct and may 
be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.215  The Court has, 
in general, presumed that state courts’ factual findings—in the 
absence of plainly unreasonable or egregious error—to be correct 
regarding issues of juror exclusion for cause,216 juror partiality,217 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States . . . . if the state court ‘applies a rule that 
contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.’”  Lafler v. Cooper, 
566 U.S. 156, 172–73 (2012) (citations omitted); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 39 
AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 7, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2018).  In Marshall v. 
Lonberger, the Court found that the State court’s factual determinations regarding the 
voluntariness of a defendant’s guilty plea in a prior proceeding were entitled to a 
presumption of correctness because the findings were based on the state court’s 
determination of the defendant’s credibility, which is a question of fact.  Marshall v. 
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432–37 (1983). 
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003)
(overcoming a presumption of correctness because district court “accepted without
question the state court’s evaluation of the demeanor of the prosecutors and jurors in
petitioner’s trial”); Moore v. Hardee, 723 F.3d 488, 499–500 (4th Cir. 2013) (failing
to overcome a presumption of correctness in state court’s rejection of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because fair-minded jurists, after considering all relevant
evidence could have disagreed as to whether counsel’s failure to object to admission
of certain evidence was prejudicial to defendant’s case); Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d
837, 853–54 (3d Cir. 2013) (failing to overcome a presumption of correctness because
the court’s finding that the defendant “acted together with” his co-defendants was
objectively reasonable); Companonio v. O’Brien, 672 F.3d 101, 111–12 (1st Cir.
2012) (failing to overcome a presumption of correctness because the court’s finding
of petitioner’s competency was not unreasonable); Murden v. Artuz, 497 F.3d 178,
198 (2d Cir. 2007) (failing to overcome a presumption of correctness because
petitioner presented evidence of a troubled relationship with the victim as a basis of
extreme emotional disturbance defense that the state court had already found to be
insufficient).
216. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426–30 (1985) (granting a presumption
of correctness because of juror credibility); Jackson v. Houk, 687 F.3d 723, 738–39
(6th Cir. 2012) (granting a presumption of correctness because a juror would not vote
for the death penalty); Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 454–56 (8th Cir. 2012)
(granting a presumption of correctness because the prosecutor removed jurors for
non-discriminatory reasons); Moody v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 260, 271–72 (5th Cir.
2007) (granting a presumption of correctness because the state court determined that
the prosecutor removed a juror for nondiscriminatory reasons); Martini v. Hendricks,
348 F.3d 360, 362 (3d Cir. 2003) (granting a presumption of correctness because a
juror was unwilling to impose death penalty); Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d 630, 639
(2d Cir. 2001) (granting a presumption of correctness because the state court
determined that prosecutors removed jurors for non-discriminatory reasons).
217. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 428 (1991) (“A trial court’s findings of juror
impartiality may ‘be overturned only for “manifest error.”’”) (quoting Patton v.
Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (per
curiam) (granting a presumption of correctness to the state court’s finding that a juror
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witness identification,218 competency to stand trial,219 competency to 
waive post-conviction proceedings,220 culpability,221 and validity of 
peremptory challenges.222  
was not biased by ex parte communications with a trial judge because such a finding 
is a question of historical fact). 
218. See Sumner v. Mata (Sumner II), 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982) (per curiam) (finding that,
although the constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures is a mixed question
of law and fact, a presumption of correctness must be accorded to state court factual
findings regarding the circumstances of identification procedures, with questions of
fact to include “whether the witnesses . . . had an opportunity to observe the crime or
were too distracted; whether the witnesses gave a detailed, accurate description; and
whether the witnesses were under pressure from prison officials or others”).
219. See Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (per curiam) (granting a
presumption of correctness to a state court’s determination of competency to stand
trial because it was “fairly supported by the record”); Rosenthal v. O’Brien, 714 F.3d
676, 648–85 (1st Cir. 2013) (granting a presumption of correctness to the state court’s
finding of competency although a competency hearing was not ever held); Harris v.
Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 350, 356 (2d Cir. 2003) (granting a presumption of
correctness to a state court’s finding of competency despite defendant’s low I.Q.,
gunshot wound to the head, and poor verbal communication); Taylor v. Horn, 504
F.3d 416, 435, 437–38 (3d Cir. 2007) (presumption of correctness accorded to state
court’s finding of competency because it relied on expert testimony and interaction
with the petitioner, which took full account of evidence that spoke to incompetency);
Wolfe v. Weisner, 488 F.3d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 2007) (granting a presumption of
correctness to a state court’s finding of competency despite denial of continuance to
allow defense counsel to review the competency report).
220. See Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735 (1990) (per curiam) (granting a
presumption of correctness to a state court’s determination of competency to waive
post-conviction relief because it was “fairly supported by the record”); Hamilton v.
Collins, 905 F.2d 825, 828 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting a presumption of correctness to a
state court’s finding of prisoner competence which waived post-conviction
proceedings because the defendant was twice examined by a psychologist and
psychiatrist who both determined him to be competent); Alston v. Dep’t of Corr., Fla.,
610 F.3d 1318, 1326–28 (11th Cir. 2010) (granting a presumption of correctness to a
state court’s finding of competence in defendant’s waiver of further legal proceedings
where hearing previously established competence).  But see O’Rourke v. Endell, 153
F.3d 560, 569 (8th Cir. 1998) (failing to grant a presumption of correctness to a state
court’s finding of competence because a capital defendant was not represented by an
attorney at a competency hearing, and therefore the defendant was not afforded due
process).
221. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 389–90 (1986), overruled in part on other
grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987).  In Cabana, the Court held that
although the federal court had correctly concluded that the jury did not find petitioner
intended lethal force, it had improperly ordered a new sentencing hearing without
determining whether the state trial or appellate court had made such a finding of
intent.  See Cabana, 474 U.S. at 383, 387.
222. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97, 100 (1986) (“We have confidence that trial
judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the
circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a
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IV.  LOCALIZING BENEFIT IN STATE OPT-IN
AEDPA was enacted with the ostensible purpose of streamlining
the capital review process, making it more efficient for all of the 
parties involved.223  As noted above, in practice, opt-in 
disproportionately benefits the states.224  Efficiency and deference, 
the two main pillars of AEDPA, are liberty-restrictive, and in 
actuality dilute petitioners’ right to substantive due process by 
limiting the availability of judicial review.225  Efficiency, coupled 
prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.”); see also Purkett v. Elem, 
514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (granting a presumption of correctness to a state court’s 
finding that prosecutor was motivated by assessed juror credibility, not race, in the 
state’s use of peremptory strikes); Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 96–97, 99 (1st Cir. 
2016) (granting a presumption of correctness to a state court’s determination that the 
prosecutor did not intend to discriminate on basis of race when the prosecutor struck 
two African-Americans and one Latina as prospective jurors); Williams v. Beard, 637 
F.3d 195, 204, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2011) (granting a presumption of correctness to state
the court’s determination that the prosecutor did not intend to discriminate on the
basis of race when the prosecutor exercised fourteen of sixteen strikes to remove
prospective African-American jurors from venire); Majid v. Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112,
130–31 (2d Cir. 2005) (granting a presumption of correctness to a state court’s
determination that prosecutors did not intend to discriminate on basis of race when
they struck twelve of sixteen prospective African-American jurors); Evans v. Smith,
220 F.3d 306, 314 (4th Cir. 2000) (granting a presumption of correctness to the state
court’s determination that the prosecutor did not intend to discriminate on the basis of
race when the prosecutor struck eight of ten prospective African-American jurors).
223. Cf. Greene v. Fisher, 556 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (noting that the AEDPA standard found
at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) allows a federal habeas court to grant relief on a state
prisoner’s claim, adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings, if the
adjudication of the claim results in a decision that is “contrary to, or involving an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” as determined by the
court, and is “‘difficult to meet’ because the purpose of the AEDPA is to ensure that
federal habeas relief functions as ‘a guard against extreme malfunctions in state
criminal justice systems,’ and not as a means of error correction.”); B. JOHN BURNS, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 34:3 (4A Iowa Practice Series, 2018 ed. 2018), Westlaw
(database updated Apr. 2018).
224. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
225. See Dan Poulson, Suspension for Beginners: Ex Parte Bollman and the
Unconstitutionality of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 374 (2008).  Proposition 66 declares that, “[b]ureaucratic
regulations have needlessly delayed enforcement of death penalty verdicts.
Eliminating wasteful spending on repetitive challenges to these regulations will result
in the fair and effective implementation of justice . . . .  The California Constitution
gives crime victims the right to timely justice.  A capital case can be fully and fairly
reviewed by both the state and federal courts within ten years.  By adopting state rules
and procedures, victims will receive timely justice and taxpayers will save hundreds
of millions of dollars.”  Death Penalty Reform & Savings Act, §§ 2(9)–(10).  “The
fiscal impact was estimated to be ‘near-term increases in state court costs––potentially
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with deference to the states’ police power and the integrity of state 
capital punishment processes, are state benefits that come at the 
expense of ensuring and protecting petitioners’ liberty interest, 
grounded in due process and fair representation.226  
A prisoner’s opportunity to have his claims heard through a 
full and fair process is an important part of habeas corpus.  
At the very least, habeas corpus should serve as a ‘backstop’ 
because ‘it is . . . the responsibility of the states under the 
due process clause to furnish a criminal defendant with a 
full and fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate his 
case.’227  
 Yet the lower federal courts are directed by the Court’s 
interpretation of AEDPA to weigh the interest of comity, finality, and 
integrity of state police power over that of due process, fair 
representation, and even innocence.228  In Hawthorne v. 
Schneiderman,229 for instance, the court noted that, “[t]his is one of 
the rare cases in which a habeas petition may well be innocent . . . .   
The question of Hawthorne’s innocence, however, is not the one we 
are encouraged—or, at times, even allowed—to ask in habeas cases 
such as this.”230  Thus, the Court has made it more and more difficult 
for petitioner’s to obtain habeas review and relief under its 
interpretation of AEDPA, “despite the fact that habeas petitions 
remain the primary vehicle for establishing claims of actual 
in tens of millions of dollars annually—due to an acceleration of spending to address 
new time lines on legal challenges to death sentences’ and ‘[s]avings of similar 
amounts in future years.’  Further, ‘potential state prison savings [could be] in the tens 
of millions of dollars annually.’”  Marla D. Tortorice, Comment, Costs versus 
Benefits: The Fiscal Realities of the Death Penalty in Pennsylvania, 78 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 519, 535 (2017).  “California’s death penalty system is ineffective because of 
waste, delays, and inefficiencies.  Fixing it will save California taxpayers millions of 
dollars every year.  These wasted taxpayer dollars would be better used for crime 
prevention, education, and services for the elderly and disabled.”  Death Penalty 
Reform & Savings Act, § 2(1). 
226. See Nasrallah, supra note 81, at 1152–53.
227. Id. at 1162 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 456 (1963)).
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innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, and other issues with serious 
implications for justice.”231  
While AEDPA may acknowledge the need for petitioners to have 
“qualified, competent, adequately resourced and adequately 
compensated counsel to death-sentenced prisoners,”232 this is very 
difficult to obtain in actuality given the Court’s restrictive habeas 
jurisprudence, the labyrinthine procedural process of capital 
punishment review, and scarce resources, to include actual properly 
compensated and learned counsel available for the post-conviction 
process.233  “The impetus for AEDPA was a perception in Congress 
that the federal death penalty proceeded at too glacial a pace.”234  The 
attempt to incorporate petitioners’ liberty interest in AEDPA while 
streamlining the review process was to set up a  
quid pro quo arrangement between the states and federal 
habeas courts: in exchange for the states providing a 
mechanism to appoint competent, compensated counsel 
during state post-conviction proceedings, the federal habeas 
court will conduct an accelerated review of state prisoners’ 
231. Noam Biale, Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement: Judging Habeas Corpus, 83 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2015); see also Andrea Keilen & Maurie Levin, Moving
Forward: A Map for Meaningful Habeas Reform in Texas Capital Cases, 34 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 207, 214 (2007) (“Most exonerations have come during habeas corpus
proceedings, when lawyers have uncovered evidence of innocence, prosecutorial
misconduct, ineffective representation, mistaken identifications, perjured testimony
by state witnesses, or unreliable scientific evidence.”).
232. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517 CW, 2013
WL 6326618, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013).
233. See Andrea A. Kochan, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:
Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. CONTEMP. L. 399, 400, 408–09 (1997);
Alexander Rundlet, Comment, Opting for Death: State Responses to the AEDPA’s
Opt-In Provisions and the Need for a Right to Post-Conviction Counsel, 1 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 661, 665–66, 718 (1999) (asserting a constitutional right to post-conviction
counsel); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of
Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development
and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate
Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1220 (2015) (“[A]ny participant in our
habeas regime would have to agree that it resembles a twisted labyrinth of
deliberately crafted legal obstacles that make it as difficult for habeas petitioners to
succeed in pursuing the Writ as it would be for a Supreme Court Justice to strike out
Babe Ruth, Joe DiMaggio, and Mickey Mantle in succession––even with the Chief
Justice calling balls and strikes.”).
234. Biale, supra note 231, at 1345–46.
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federal habeas claims.  A state that has adopted such a 
mechanism is said to have ‘opted in.’235  
 Presently, no state has qualified for opt-in because states have 
failed, amongst other things, to provide the requisite competent and 
properly compensated counsel.236  If a state is successful in opting in, 
then it is able to take full advantage of “the benefit of section 
2261(e), which provides that ‘[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence 
of counsel during State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a 
capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising 
under section 2554.’”237  AEDPA opt-in shields the states from 
claims of ineffective/incompetent of counsel.238   
A. Opt-In: Assessing Substantive & Procedural Benefits
It seems that AEDPA tries to reconcile two aims that are somewhat
at odds with one another by providing states with efficiency 
incentives to opt-in that respect their sovereignty and dominance in 
235. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 108; see also JOSEPH A. MELUSKY & KEITH A. PESTO,
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 144–45
(2003); Spears v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 1026, 1039, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
even though the Ninth Circuit concluded that Arizona qualified for opt-in status, that
Chapter 154 would not apply to the petitioner because the State failed to appoint
counsel in a timely fashion).
In Spears v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona now 
qualifies to ‘opt in’ to an accelerated federal review process in 
death penalty cases under [AEDPA].  Arizona has opted in by 
enacting procedures for appointing qualified, experienced 
attorneys to represent indigent death-row inmates in state post-
conviction relief (PCR) proceedings.  Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to apply the accelerated review provisions to the 
Spears case because there was a lengthy delay in appointing that 
defendant's PCR attorney.  But the case is significant because it is 
the first in which a federal circuit court has approved a state’s 
efforts to opt in under the AEDPA. 
Kent E. Cattani & Monica B. Klapper, Representing the Indigent: Spears v. Stewart in 
Capital Cases, 28 ARIZ. ATT’Y 36, 36 (2002), https://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/ 
PDF_Articles/AZAT0202Indigentp36-43.pdf. 
236. See Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Post-
Conviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital
Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 35–36 (2003); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 776
(10th Cir. 1998); Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp. 2d 893, 923 (E.D. Ark. 2002); Johnson
v. Nagle, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1335 n.26 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d
1106, 1131 n.58 (11th Cir. 2000); Leavitt v. Arave, 927 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D. Idaho
1996).
237. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 120.
238. See id.
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the realm of criminal law, and concomitantly providing for fairness, 
due process, and adequate, learned representation for petitioners 
seeking habeas review.239  Upon signing AEDPA into law, President 
Clinton stated, “I have signed this bill because I am confident that the 
Federal courts will interpret these provisions to preserve independent 
review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock constitutional 
principle of an independent judiciary.”240  Preserving independent 
habeas review seems in line with ensuring due process and fair 
representation for poor people of color in capital sentencing.241  Opt-
in, theoretically, provides a benefit for the petitioner because the state 
must provide “qualified, competent, adequately resourced and 
adequately compensated counsel to death-sentenced prisoners”242 at 
the on-set of post-conviction proceedings.  On its face, AEDPA 
appears to ensure that a state’s imposition of capital punishment is 
based on a fair and reliable process that assuages the effects of 
seemingly perpetual delays associated with repetitious habeas 
litigation.243  States may thus opt-in if they comply with the mandates 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2261 post-conviction procedures, which include 
provision for competent counsel and reasonable litigation funding to 
indigent capital prisoners in the post-conviction process.244   
The importance of providing competent counsel to indigent 
petitioners is stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2261(e), which precludes 
petitioners from claiming ineffectiveness of counsel as a basis for 
review.245  It is through this mandate that AEDPA attempts to 
establish an incentive for states to provide competent counsel 
throughout state collateral review, recognizing that such counsel is 
“crucial to ensuring fairness and protecting the constitutional rights 
of capital litigants.”246  
239. See infra notes 240–71 and accompanying text.
240. Statement, William J. Clinton, President, XLII U.S. 1993-2001, Statement on Signing
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, THE AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Apr. 24, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52713.
241. See Goldfarb, supra note 51, at 1395–96.
242. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517 CW, 2013
WL 6326618, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013).
243. Stummer, supra note 62, at 619–22.
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2012).
245. § 2261(e).
246. Ashmus v. Calderon, 935 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting the Judicial
Conference of the United States Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in
Capital Cases, Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. 3239,
3240 (1989)); Stummer, supra note 62, at 619–20; Patrick J. Fuster, Comment,
Taming Cerberus: The Beast at AEDPA’s Gates, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1325, 1375
(2017).
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Yet, by denying access to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
as well as inaugurating strict time limits, substantial restrictions on 
re-raising claims, curbing successive petitions, and deferring to state 
capital sentencing,247 the liberty-enhancing potential of habeas is 
severely constrained.248 
States can, and often do, abuse the criminal process and 
ignore individual rights . . . .  State criminal justice systems 
often let constitutional violations such as prosecutorial 
misconduct—tampering with witnesses, withholding 
exculpatory evidence, and even destroying evidence—go 
unnoticed.  Further, a good deal of academic evidence 
shows that some states even “systematically violate criminal 
defendants’ rights.”  For example, many states use a “bait-
and-switch” technique to “prevent[] defendants from ever 
having their federal claims considered.”249  
By curbing access to habeas, the poor and people of color are 
further removed from due process and fairness in representation.250  
Habeas as a liberty-enhancing mechanism is important to maintain 
because of the sub-set of the overall population that relies upon it to 
attain access to a degree of due process and representative fairness 
that is lacking at the state level in capital punishment process and 
sentencing.251  Habeas as a liberty-enhancing mechanism helps to 
prevent the effects that flow from a state-centric interpretation of 
habeas that obscure the  
most important truth about the capital punishment system in 
this country:  
while . . . innocent men and women are on death row, a 
much larger number are there because there is no 
adversarial system of justice for the majority of people who 
247. See Biale, supra note 231, at 1346.
248. Id. at 1346–47.
249. Nasrallah, supra note 81, at 1165.
250. Bergman, supra note 133, at 42.
251. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
748, 759–60 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court habeas cases arising from state
courts); see also Primus, supra note 59, at 2, 17–22 (discussing multiple scenarios in
which due process and/or representative fairness are lacking at the state level).
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face the death penalty––who are all poor . . . and a majority 
of whom are men and women of color.252 
The Federal courts are vested with the power to determine whether 
a State’s quid pro quo arrangement complies with Chapter 154.253  
An opt-in state’s failure to comply prevents it from taking advantage 
of expedited post-conviction federal habeas review.254  Overall, with 
some exceptions, the lower federal courts have interpreted AEDPA to 
require states to comply by enacting specific competency standards 
to ensure the appointment of adequate, competent and learned capital 
counsel.255  Because Chapter 154 restricts petitioners’ access to 
habeas, states’ compliance in providing a mechanism by which to 
provide proper counsel to petitioners is a prerequisite for state access 
to obtaining deference.256  When a petitioner challenges the adequacy 
of an appointment mechanism, the state must demonstrate 
compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) and (c); state mechanisms must 
not suffer from incoherence or incompleteness.257   
[P]rocedures must be ‘mandatory and carry the force of
law.’  Unfettered discretion in a decision-maker to permit or
deny appointment of counsel will not suffice. Moreover,
post-hoc rationalizations that guidelines or non-binding
procedure constitutes a ‘mechanism’ or a ‘piecemeal
attempt to pull together the various provisions . . . will fail.
Instead, such procedures must foreclose differing
252. Bergman, supra note 133, at 42. “Former California Governor Pat Brown [has said]
‘[i]n fact the most glaring weakness is that no matter how efficient and fair the death
penalty may seem in theory, in actual practice it is primarily inflicted upon the weak,
the poor, the ignorant and against racial minorities.’  He wrote that nearly 50 years
ago; that has still not changed.”  Id.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 2264(c) (2012).
254. See Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 120–22.
255. See Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1267 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated in part on other
grounds, 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997); Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance
Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 348–49, 353–64 (2003) (discussing the problem of
ineffective assistance of habeas counsel and conducting a survey of state mechanisms
enacted to ensure adequate representation); Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of
the Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. 
VA. L. REV. 863, 902–03 (1996) (stating that capital defendants represented by
appointed counsel are often no better off in federal habeas proceedings than pro se
defendants).
256. Stummer, supra note 62, at 621–22.
257. Id. at 622–23.
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interpretations of how the mechanism is to operate and 
‘must be put down in a concrete fashion where it can be 
seen and relied upon.’  Thus traditional court practices or 
subjective determinations by State courts will not suffice as 
a ‘mechanism.’  The state's mechanism should reflect ‘an 
affirmative, institutionalized, formal commitment’ to 
appointing competent counsel during post-conviction 
proceedings.258  
Fair representation of a petitioner, at its core, is derived from 
learned counsel who ensure or better facilitates fundamental notions 
of fairness, due process, and the legitimacy of a state capital 
conviction and review process.259  Learned counsel is key given the 
intricate technical complexity that characterizes capital punishment 
schema and federal habeas review.260  The Court has stated that, the 
“complexity of our jurisprudence in this area . . . makes it unlikely 
that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for 
collateral relief without the assistance of persons learned in the 
law.”261  Being “learned in the law” is a key part of effectuating 
genuine representation in the context of habeas review.262  Yet, “after 
years of attempted reform, beginning with Chapter 154 of the 
[AEDPA], many of the same issues that triggered reform efforts still 
plague the federal habeas system.”263  One of the major stumbling 
blocks has been the provision of adequate and competent counsel that 
is learned in the law.264  Interestingly, the fact that no state which has 
sought opt-in has actually qualified for it is indicative of the deep 
systemic problem of the paucity of substantive due process and 
fairness in the capital punishment schemes of said states.265  
258. Id. at 623; see also Hammel, supra note 255, at 348, 353–54, 360–61, 364–65
(discussing the problem of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel and conducting a
survey of state mechanisms enacted to ensure adequate representation); Howard, Jr.,
supra note 255, at 902–03 (stating that capital defendants represented by appointed
counsel are often no better off in federal habeas proceedings than pro se defendants).
259. See Stummer, supra note 62, at 632.
260. See id. at 606–07.
261. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “[T]his
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence unquestionably is difficult even for a trained
lawyer to master.”  Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. See Stummer, supra note 62, at 631–32.
263. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 107; see Hon. William A. Fletcher, Madison Lecture:
Our Broken Death Penalty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 824 (2014).
264. See Hammel, supra note 255, at 348; Howard, Jr., supra note 255, at 892; Stummer,
supra note 62, at 611–12.
265. See Stummer, supra note 62, at 608–09.
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The appointment of less-than-qualified or clearly under-qualified 
counsel has a detrimental affect and effect on petitioners’ liberty 
interest.266  Failure, for instance, of counsel to effectively manage the 
complex technical dimensions of the habeas review process, such as 
timeliness of appointment, are indicative of counsel that is unable to 
provide adequate and learned representation267 which, in turn, 
exacerbates the representational deficiency of opt-in under 
AEDPA.268  Because “AEDPA forecloses claims of ineffectiveness 
of post-conviction counsel, and demands explicit post-conviction 
competency standards, the Chapter 154 provisions essentially raise 
the standard of counsel’s performance . . . .”269  Competent counsel 
must be highly learned in the complexity of capital litigation, 
doctrinally and experientially.270  Lack of an in-depth and 
comprehensive understanding of the intricacies of capital punishment 
will negatively impact counsel’s ability to provide fair and competent 
representation.271  
B. Factors that Impact Due Process & Fair Representation
To qualify for opt-in, states must: (1) Establish by statute or rule a
mechanism for appointment of counsel for post-conviction 
proceedings; (2) ensure that counsel are competent; (3) provide 
counsel reasonable litigation expenses; and (4) offer counsel to all 
capital prisoners seeking post-conviction relief, with actual 
appointment occurring upon a determination that a petitioner is 
indigent and has accepted the offer.272  The following is a brief 
266. See, e.g., Hammel, supra note 255, at 373–74.
267. See Stummer, supra note 62, at 615–17.
268. Id. at 609.
269. Id. at 630–32 (“[A]ppointed counsel must have explicit experience with preparing
state habeas petitions and representing capital appellants during motions or
hearings. . . .  Counsel needs to be learned, trained, and properly seasoned.  Only such
counsel will cure the problems of delay and repetitive filings while fully
comprehending the capital process from start to finish.”).
270. See id. at 630.
271. See id. at 615–17.
272. 28 U.S.C. § 2261, 2265 (2012); see Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129, 1141
(N.D. Fla. 1996) (clarifying that states must satisfy all four requirements in order to
opt-in), rev’d on other grounds, 147 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 1998).  Additionally, courts
have read a fifth element into the statute: that a State must actually comply with the
mechanism it has established.  See Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir.
1996) (“the Act establishes a quid-pro-quo relationship: A [sic] state seeking greater
federal deference to its habeas decisions in capital cases must, by appointing
competent counsel to represent indigent petitioners, further ensure that its own habeas
proceedings are meaningful”); see also Tucker v. Moore, 56 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614
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exposition of select issues that the states have had in procuring 
“qualified, competent, adequately resourced and adequately 
compensated counsel to death-sentenced prisoners.”273  
1. Standards of Competency
Overall, the courts have experienced four major problems with
respect to standards of competency in the realm of habeas review in 
capital punishment: “(1) the lack of a post-conviction experience 
requirement; (2) nonmandatory or nonbinding competency 
requirements; (3) de minimis competency requirements; or (4) no 
competency standards at all.”274  Over-worked, inexperienced, and 
underfunded counsel is a recurring issue in meeting the requirement 
for the provision of counsel.275  Capital pre- and post-conviction 
processes are  
plagued with inexperienced counsel or overworked public 
defenders and chronic underfunding.  These problems 
potentially cause investigation, research, and expert work 
necessary for a meaningful defense to go undone.  Because 
the majority of death-penalty states fail to adequately fund 
death-penalty litigation, public defender offices are 
understaffed and overworked.  Public defenders are often 
required to represent multiple capital defendants or carry a 
heavy felony caseload while representing one capital 
defendant.276  
 Furthermore, despite the fact that capital cases involve highly 
complex technical principles and procedures, insufficient 
funding and lack of specific appointment standards tend to 
attract inexperienced court appointed criminal lawyers . . . 
‘attorneys defending death penalty cases, as a class, are less 
(D.S.C. 1999) (“If the Respondents did not follow their own procedures . . . when 
appointing counsel for the Petitioner during the state [Public Defender Commission] 
proceedings, then the Respondents cannot invoke [§ 2263] against the Petitioner in 
this federal habeas action.”). 
273. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517 CW, 2013 WL
6326618, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013).  Cf. Mills v. Anderson, 961 F. Supp. 198,
201 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“The provisions of [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA)] are drafted with mandatory language, and neither substantial
compliance nor de facto compliance is sufficient.”).
274. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 130.
275. Stummer, supra note 62, at 611.
276. Id.
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experienced and far more likely to be disciplined for 
unprofessional conduct than the bar as a whole . . . .  In 
litigation that requires proficiency in many areas of study, 
capital defendants are typically represented by lawyers who 
simply cannot afford to acquire that base of knowledge.’277   
Competent counsel is better able to comprehend and navigate the 
complexities of capital punishment procedures such as exhaustion 
requirements and retroactivity, the prevention of procedural default, 
and if default does occur, strategies on how to better argue cause and 
prejudice.278  In Mata v. Johnson,279 for instance, the court found that 
§ 2261(b) required “explicit standards of competency,”280 specifically
“mandatory standards”281 to ensure that competent counsel is in fact
being appointed.  “Without the affirmative establishment of a
mechanism for competency standards, states can reap the benefits of
stronger finality rules, while supplying an indigent capital defendant
with” less experienced counsel.282
2. Compensation Mechanism
Several states’ appointment mechanisms have been found
inadequate because of deficient compensation schemes to ensure 
adequate and competent counsel.283  In Ashmus v. Calderon,284 the 
District Court found that the state’s mechanism expressly precluded 
277. Id. at 613; see, e.g., Ashmus v. Woodford, 202 F.3d 1160, 1167–70 (9th Cir. 2000)
(evaluating the sufficiency of California’s competency standards); Wright v.
Angelone, 944 F. Supp. 460, 467–68 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding that standards for
counsel competency must be set forth explicitly in the initial mechanism authorizing
the appointment of counsel, and that competency requirements must limit
appointment of counsel to those attorneys with experience in capital cases); Hill v.
Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129, 1141–44 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (reviewing the state’s
competent-counsel requirement).
278. Stummer, supra note 62, at 626.
279. Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated in part on other grounds, 105
F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997).
280. Id. at 1267.
281. Id.
282. Stummer, supra note 62, at 629; see also Ashmus v. Calderon, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1175,
1180 (“Unless a state affirmatively establishes that each condition described in
Chapter 154 has been met, it may not claim the chapter’s benefits.  This is the price of
stronger finality rules and greater deference to state habeas proceedings.”) (citation
omitted).
283. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 138.
284. Ashmus v. Calderon, 935 F. Supp. 1048, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev’d on other
grounds, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
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compensation for raising certain collateral claims.285  The court found 
that, in order for a state to opt-in, that state must have a mechanism 
for the payment of reasonable litigation expenses to appointed 
counsel.286  Many states have failed to satisfy this requirement for a 
variety of reasons,287 such as setting limits on compensation well 
below a standard that is considered proper or necessary to ensure that 
a petitioner is receiving adequate, competent counsel.288   
3. Reasonable Compensation
In Booth v. Maryland,289 the court found that Maryland’s
“mechanism” for paying and reimbursing attorneys assisting capital 
defendants with post-conviction proceedings was unreasonable 
because the attorneys were paid “at a rate $41 less than the rate 
necessary . . . to pay . . . overhead [costs]” and that amount was 
disparate to federal attorneys appointed to represent capital 
defendants in federal habeas corpus actions, who were routinely 
“paid up to $125 per hour and fee awards in six figures” under the 
Federal Criminal Justice Act.290  As a result, the court concluded that 
the state’s amount of compensation for capital counsel was 
unreasonably low.291  The reasoning in Booth aligns with the court’s 
reasoning in Baker v. Corcoran, wherein the court lamented that “we 
cannot conclude that Maryland adequately compensates state post-
conviction counsel . . . [because] [a] compensation system that results 
in substantial losses to the appointed attorney or his firm simply 
cannot be deemed adequate.”292 
4. Litigation Expenses
In Satcher v. Netherland,293 the court found that the state failed to
provide reasonable litigation expenses, notwithstanding the fact that 
budget legislation allowed for general court expenditures.294   
285. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 138.
286. Ashmus, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
287. See Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 138–39.
288. See Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 286 (4th Cir. 2000).
289. Booth v. Maryland, 940 F. Supp. 849, 854 (D. Md. 1996), vacated, 112 F.3d 139 (4th
Cir. 1997).
290. Id. at 854–55.
291. Id.
292. Baker, 220 F.3d at 285–86.
293. Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222, 1241 (E.D. Va. 1996).
294. See id. at 1241.
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[T]he Act requires that the mechanism to appoint counsel, to
pay counsel, and to pay counsel’s litigation expenses be
established by a state statute, a rule of the state’s highest
court or of an authorized state agency.  In so doing, the Act
requires a formal, institutionalized commitment to the
payment of counsel and litigation expenses.  The
institutionalized and statutorily predicated condition set by
Congress cannot be met unless the mechanism for these
purposes is established by the State in the fashion prescribed
by Congress.295
Furthermore, the court found that 
Congress has determined that competent counsel who will 
be reasonably compensated and who has the availability of 
funds for reasonable litigation expenses is essential to full 
and fair state habeas proceedings.  If any one of the 
safeguards of Section 2261 is not met, but the state is 
nonetheless provided with the ‘benefits’ of opt-in status 
anyway, prisoners will be subjected to less than full and fair 
state habeas review and then truncated federal court review 
without having the guarantees thought by Congress to 
warrant the truncated review.296 
5. Actual Compliance
Several courts have held that state mechanisms have failed under
Chapter 154 because the states do not actually comply with the 
mechanism.297  “A state seeking greater federal deference to its 
habeas decisions in capital cases must, by appointing competent 
counsel to represent indigent petitioners, further ensure that its own 
habeas proceedings are meaningful.”298  A state must identify and 
apply the procedural criteria.299  “[W]here a state has set forth 
procedures for appointing counsel, the state must actually follow 
those procedures in order to opt-in under § 2261.”300   
295. Id. at 1242.
296. Id. at 1245.
297. Kannenberg, supra note 129, at 143.
298. Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
299. Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 286 (4th Cir. 2000).
300. Parker, supra note 97, at 1994; see also Tucker v. Moore, 56 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614
(S.C. 1999) (finding that South Carolina was barred from opting into § 2263 because
the state failed to follow its own statutory mechanism), aff’d sub nom.  Tucker v.
Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 604–05 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] state must not only enact a
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6. Entry of Order
To opt-in, a state “must offer counsel to all State prisoners under
capital sentence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court 
of record– (1) appointing one or more counsels to represent the 
prisoner . . . .”301  It is important that the appointment is timely 
“because the 180-day limitation period on filing the habeas action 
begins to run ‘immediately upon the conclusion of direct review.’”302  
In Baker, the court found the following state interpretation flawed:  
[T]he State argues cursorily that it has done all that is
necessary to comply with § 2261(c), which requires that any
mechanism for the appointment and compensation of state
post-conviction counsel ‘must provide for the entry of an
order by a court of record’ appointing counsel, finding that
the petitioner has rejected the offer of counsel, or finding
that the petitioner is not indigent and thus not entitled to
counsel . . . . 
To reject this argument, we need look no further than the 
plain language of § 2261(c), which by its terms requires that 
a mechanism for the appointment and compensation of state 
post-conviction counsel provide for the entry of an order 
regarding the appointment, refusal, or denial of counsel.  At 
present, no provision of Maryland law comports with this 
requirement.303  
7. Appointment Mechanism
To opt-in under § 2261(b), a state must establish a mechanism
through legislative statute, rule of court, or agency regulation.304  
Courts have interpreted this portion of the statute to provide 
‘mechanism’ and standards for post-conviction review counsel, but those mechanisms 
and standards must in fact be complied with before the state may invoke the time 
limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2263.”); Grayson v. Epps, 338 F. Supp.2d 699, 704 (S.D. 
Miss. 2004) (“The state of Mississippi should have offered proof of some kind that it 
actually complied with § 2261(a), (b) & (c).  It did not.  Accordingly, the Court finds 
that the State of Mississippi has not carried its burden to prove that it is qualified to 
avail itself of the opt-in structure of the AEDPA, and Respondents request for such 
must be denied.”). 
301. 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c) (2012); see also Hall v. Luebbers, 341 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir.
2003) (stating that a rule providing for the appointment of counsel to less than all
indigent defendants does not satisfy the requirements of § 2261).
302. Parker, supra note 97, at 1991 (quoting Brown v. Puckett, No. 3:01CV197-D, 2003
WL 21018627, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 12, 2003)).
303. Baker, 220 F.3d at 287.
304. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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procedural protection for habeas petitioners.305  For example, a state 
may enforce expedited habeas review under [AEDPA] only if it 
affirmatively establishes that it has satisfied its obligation to provide 
a comprehensive mechanism for competent representation of indigent 
capital prisoners.306   
Ashmus “is just one example of the courts’ demands for literal 
statutory compliance.  It recognizes the significance of both the 
substantive and procedural safeguards required by § 2261 . . . [and] 
suggests that defects in the procedural enactment of the mechanism 
would be fatal even if the appointment mechanism were 
substantively sound.”307 
C. Liberty-Restrictive Habeas
The failure of states to qualify for opt-in under AEDPA sheds light
on the larger interpretive context within which it is situated, e.g., 
federalism, finality, comity, due process, fairness, and the politics of 
death.308  The Court’s relatively recent jurisprudence pertaining to 
habeas generally, as well in conjunction with its interpretation of 
AEDPA over the last 28 years, further points out the representational 
deficiency that permeates the post-conviction review of state death 
sentences.309  As the Court notes in Lockyer v. Andrade,310 the “gloss 
of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by 
conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.  It is not 
enough that a federal habeas court, in its ‘independent review of the 
legal question’ is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was 
‘erroneous.’”311  The Court’s opinions in Harrington v. Richter312 
305. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
306. See Ashmus v. Woodford, 202 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (“California can opt-
in to Chapter 154’s expedited procedures, however, only if its mechanism for the
appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of
collateral counsel is ‘established.’”) (citation omitted).
307. Parker, supra note 97, at 1982–83.
308. See Marceau, supra note 156, at 106–16; Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA
Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and
Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 592–602 (2013).
309. See generally Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953,
977–93 (2012); Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. 
PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1–4 (2016) (referencing the Court’s interpretation of
AEDPA over the last twenty-eight years).
310. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).
311. Id.
312. See generally Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104–13 (2011) (referencing the
court’s interpretation of AEDPA and its habeas jurisprudence).
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and Cullen v. Pinholster313 are exemplary of the Court’s liberty-
restrictive interpretation of AEDPA and its habeas jurisprudence.314  
In Richter, the Court found that “§ 2254(d) does not require a state 
court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 
‘adjudicated on the merits.”315  States do not have to provide reasons 
for why relief has been denied.316  This practice is in line with a 
liberty-restrictive interpretation of habeas.317  In support of this 
approach to habeas review, the Court sets forth the nebulous 
requirement that to review and find error with or overturn a state 
court’s proceedings or judgment, it must be the case that a “state 
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 
habeas relief so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the 
correctness of the state court’s decision.”318  In Pinholster, the Court 
held “that evidence later introduced in federal court is irrelevant to § 
2254(d)(1) review.”319  The effect of the Court’s holding is that  
313. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (2011).
314. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (finding that in “the absence of
a constitutional violation, the petitioner bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney
errors made in the course of the representation” in the context of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel).  But see Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 (2012) (holding
that AEDPA did not bar petitioner from using his post-conviction attorney’s
ineffectiveness to establish “cause” for his procedural default).
The Martinez Court presented its ruling as a narrow one.  For one 
thing, it said that its holding was equitable rather than 
constitutional, noting that states would therefore have the 
flexibility to choose between appointing initial state 
postconviction counsel or defending cases on the merits in federal 
habeas review.  Moreover, the Court said that its ruling was 
limited to cases in which (a) state law required ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims to be raised in initial-review 
collateral proceedings; (b) there was no initial postconviction 
attorney, or the initial postconviction attorney’s performance rose 
to the level of a Strickland violation; (c) the underlying defaulted 
claim was an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim; and (d) 
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was substantial. 
Eve B. Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the 
Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L. J. 2611–13 (2013); see also Freedman, 
supra note 308, at 592–602. 
315. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011); see Matthew Seligman, Harrington’s
Wake: Unanswered Questions on AEDPA’s Application to Summary Dispositions, 64
STAN. L. REV. 469, 469–75 (2012) (discussing the nuances that attach when assessing
the differences between written opinions and summary dispositions).
316. See Ritcher, 562 U.S. at 98.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
319. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 184 (2011).
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petitioners cannot introduce new evidence of their federal 
claims in federal courts if those claims had already been 
adjudicated on the merits in state court.  Each of these 
[interpretations therefore] add their own layers of deference 
that federal courts must apply before asking whether the 
state court unreasonably applied federal law.320   
The Court’s opinions thus interpret § 2254(d), the modern 
centerpiece of federal habeas practice, so as to substantially curtail 
state prisoners’ access to habeas review.321  Pinholster accomplishes 
this aim by holding that new evidence, not originally part of the state 
court record generally, “has no bearing” on the federal court's review 
of the state court decision.322  Richter, by contrast, limits the 
functional work or substantive merits review of a federal habeas 
court; i.e., it elaborates on the narrow set of circumstances in which a 
federal court may disturb a state conviction.323  
The Court’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) has the effect of 
ensuring that most petitioners are not eligible for relief despite the 
fact that their convictions may rest on unconstitutional procedures, 
since “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law.”324  Unless an error is so 
egregious as to amount to an intentional disregard for the supremacy 
of federal law, then an unconstitutional conviction should apparently 
not be reversed by a federal court, “lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ 
the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is 
meant to serve.”325  This reasoning has the effect of also protecting 
“the autonomy of the states and the comity interests at issue in our 
320. Nasrallah, supra note 81, at 1169.
321. See Marceau, supra note 156, at 107; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
322. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185; Freedman, supra note 308, at 597–98.
323. Wiseman, supra note 309, at 987–88; Richter, 562 U.S. at 103 (finding that “a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal
court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement”
in order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court).
324. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)); §
2254(d)(1); Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1754
(2000) (“[T]his understanding keeps faith with the Court's insistence that federal
courts must sometimes withhold habeas relief even if they think that a state court
reached an erroneous determination of a mixed question. The test is not whether the
state court reached the correct decision, but whether that court reached a decision that
was reasonable.”).
325. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011); see Fletcher, supra note 263, at 824
(discussing habeas relief in the context of AEDPA).
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criminal justice system.”326  Richter suggests that AEDPA has 
brought about significant changes on the role that federal courts play 
in reviewing state convictions.327  Indeed, as other legal scholars have 
stated: 
Federal constitutional errors by state courts present an ever-
shrinking target for federal habeas courts.  Only the clearest 
state court errors – indeed, only those errors that border on 
outright defiance or rejection of federal supremacy – will 
warrant federal intervention to cure an unjust conviction or 
sentence.  And even state court judgments that do not 
contain any reasoning are entitled to the full scope of 
AEDPA shielding deference.328   
AEDPA contains various limitations on the courts’ authority to 
grant habeas, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which states that 
“with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state 
court proceedings” the writ shall not be granted unless adjudication 
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”329  
Construing this provision as a threshold barrier to fact-finding by the 
district court, the Court in Pinholster held that in determining 
whether petitioner has met the standard the federal habeas court must 
confine itself to a consideration of the record that the state courts had 
before them.330  When performing this task, the federal district courts 
are required under § 2254(e)(1) “to presume the truth of the facts 
found by the state courts.”331 
V. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, modern habeas has
been reconfigured to restrict federal overview of state capital 
processes.332  The AEDPA regime reflects, in part, a larger structural 
problem wherein race and class have an adverse and disproportionate 
effect on petitioners seeking review of their convictions in a federal 
326. Marceau, supra note 156, at 110; Premo, 562 U.S. at 122.
327. Biale, supra note 231, at 1347–48; Richter, 562 U.S. at 91–92.
328. Marceau, supra note 156, at 116.
329. § 2254(d)(1).
330. Id.; Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 (holding that judicial “review under § 2254(d)(1) is
limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the
merits”).
331. Freedman, supra note 308, at 598; § 2254(e)(1).
332. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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forum.333  Race especially factors into a negative-impact calculus vis-
à-vis substantive due process and fair representation of petitioner’s 
liberty interest because of the disproportionate amount of people of 
color that are charged with and convicted of capital crimes.334  
Habeas, as a liberty-enhancing mechanism, is important because it 
provides a modicum of due process and fairness.335  As the 
Connecticut Supreme Court notes, the  
eighth amendment is offended not only by the random or 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by the 
greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of 
pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed. . . .  
The eighth amendment, then, requires that any capital 
sentencing scheme determine which defendants will be 
eligible for the death penalty on the basis of legitimate, 
rational, nondiscriminatory factors.336  
Combine race with the deleterious effects of poverty, and you have 
an entire class of people that begin their odyssey through the criminal 
justice system at a severe detrimental representational deficit.337  
Habeas litigation is highly technical, complex, and constantly in flux, 
presenting profound challenges to ensuring that petitioners are 
accorded adequate and learned counsel to navigate the maze of 
habeas litigation.338  “Simply navigating through the procedural maze 
of habeas practice . . . is a formidable task for inmates proceeding pro 
se and prisoners represented by counsel.  Tragically, those who have 
had a fundamentally unfair trial, and even those who are innocent, 
may easily stumble.”339  
Prisoners almost always lack the legal training to identify 
constitutional problems, and, worse, they have every reason 
to file a federal petition–the possibility of release–and very 
little reason not to.  The result is a ‘lottery’ in which the 
federal courts are tasked with working through thousands of 
333. See ROSICH, supra note 173, at 20.
334. Id. at 2–3.
335. Stevenson, supra note 202, at 365.
336. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 19 (Conn. 2015).
337. See ROSICH, supra note 173, at 8.
338. John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 272–73 (1996).
339. Id. at 272–73; see also Stummer, supra note 62, at 606–07; Tran, supra note 90, at
167.
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poorly drafted or documented and often frivolous petitions 
in search of a few winners.340   
Judges themselves have found that “potentially meritorious claims 
are either barred from review by the onerous procedural provisions or 
subject to such an obsequious level of deference under the 
substantive standard of review that [AEDPA] perpetuates major 
miscarriages of justice, including the execution of the innocent.”341  
Therefore, in the realm of capital punishment and federal overview 
of state capital punishment, habeas, as a liberty-enhancing legal 
mechanism, may provide petitioners with a means of obtaining a 
degree of adequate, learned representation to facilitate their rights to 
due process and equal justice under the U.S. Constitution.342  Thus, it 
may be time for policy makers, including the federal courts, to 
seriously reconsider whether AEDPA should be reconfigured or 
replaced to endow habeas with a better balance between the liberty-
enhancing and liberty-restrictive capacity.343  Properly balancing the 
interests of petitioners with those of the states would result in more 
effective and substantive habeas review344 and reconfigure habeas to 
accomplish its aim of substantively protecting petitioners’ 
constitutional liberty interests via due process and fair 
representation.345   
340. Wiseman, supra note 195, at 1159; see also Freedman, supra note 308, at 595–96;
Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM & 
MARY L. REV. 2071, 2100 (2014).
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342. See Woolley, supra note 20, at 442.
343. See id.
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